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LEGISLATING PREEMPTION

JAMELLE C. SHARPE *
A BSTRACT
Federal preemption is perhaps the most important public law issue
of the day. The stakes in preemption cases are enormous, as preemption determines whether the federal government or the states
control regulatory policy in a host of politically controversial contexts. Congress clearly has primary constitutional authority in
setting federal preemption policy, but, for numerous political and
practical reasons, cannot be solely responsible for its implementation.
Determining which organ of the federal government is best at
implementing preemption policy has therefore become the central
preoccupation of the academic literature. While this comparative
institutional analysis is certainly important in allocating preemption
policy-making business, it has elided a very important issue:
Congress has an interest not only in what substantive preemption
policy should be, but also in who should be primarily responsible for
implementing it. In other words, there is a strategic delegation choice
to be made by Congress for which current institutional choice
approaches to preemption do not fully account.
This Article addresses the delegation issue by providing a
framework for how Congress should be “legislating preemption.” It
identifies two previously overlooked challenges posed by delegating
preemption implementation responsibility to the federal courts
instead of to federal agencies. First, Congress has only weak policing
* A ssociate Professor of Law and R ichard W . and M arie L. C orm an Scholar, U niversity
of Illinois C ollege of Law. J.D ., Yale Law School, 2003; B.A ., N ew York U niversity, 1997. For
their helpful com m ents and suggestions, I thank Richard A lbert, R alph Brubaker, M argareth
E tienne, Tara G rove, Patrick K eenan, B ob Law less, A ndy Leipold, Jim Pfander, Jack Preis,
Larry R ibstein, Robert Schapiro, C atherine Sharkey, N icola Sharpe, C harles Tabb, Suja
Thom as, Franita T olson, participants in faculty w orkshops at N orthwestern U niversity
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research assistance. O f course, all errors are m ine alone.
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tools when it delegates to federal courts, and therefore has little
opportunity to correct the judiciary when it strays from Congress’s
preemption policy preferences. Second, in its preemption jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has adopted what this Article terms a
Centralization Default, which leads it to generally disfavor antipreemption arguments when Congress does not provide clear
instructions to the contrary. The Article then proposes that Congress
respond to these challenges by drafting broad standards and creating
favorable legislative history when preemption policy coincides with
the Centralization Default. By contrast, Congress should draft clear
rules when it wants to overcome the Centralization Default. After
developing the “legislating preemption” framework, the Article uses
the Dodd-Frank Act’s national bank preemption provisions to
illustrate what happens when Congress does not apply the framework. As the Article shows, Congress’s failure to account for its weak
post-delegation policing tools or the Centralization Default will likely
lead to more federal preemption than Congress intended.
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I NTRODUCTION
Once an arcane backwater of constitutional jurisprudence loved
almost exclusively by law professors, preemption has become the
focus of the country’s most contentious political issues. From
immigration to gay marriage, from tort reform to financial reform,
the propriety of displacing state law with federal law is quite
possibly the most important public law question of the day. When
framed in more practical terms, the enormity of the stakes in
preemption cases becomes unmistakably clear: preemption determines which level of government—federal or state—gets to control
regulatory policy in a complex federal system.1 It should therefore
come as no surprise that the Supreme Court has significantly
increased its involvement in preemption issues over the past twenty
years. Indeed, the Court docketed five preemption cases for the
2010-2011 Term alone.2
Despite this new interest in preemption, little attention has been
given to a persistent and fundamental puzzle that it presents:
how horizontal allocations of governmental power—as between
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the administrative state—affect
vertical distributions of governmental power—as between the
federal government and the governments of the several states. In
other words, how does assigning preemption decision making to one
federal body or another make it more or less likely that federal law
will trump state law? In other areas dealing with allocations of
federal and state power, such as those implicating the dormant
1. See R ichard A. E pstein & M ichael S . G reve, Federal Preem ption: Principles and
Politics, F EDERALIST O UTLOOK, June 2007, at 1, 1-2, 6, http://ww w .aei.org/docLib/20080228_
E psteinG reve.pdf.
2. The C ourt consolidated three generic drug labeling cases. D em ahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593
F.3d 428 (5th C ir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. C t. 817 (2010); M ensing v. W yeth, Inc., 588 F.3d
603 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom . A ctavis E lizabeth, LLC v. M ensing, 131 S. C t. 817
(2010); M ensing v. W yeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603 (8th C ir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom . PLIV A ,
Inc. v. M ensing, 131 S. C t. 817 (2010). Four additional preem ption cases w ere on the C ourt’s
docket for the 2010-2011 Term . Laster v. A T& T M obility LLC , 584 F.3d 849 (9th C ir. 2009),
cert. granted sub nom . A T& T M obility LLC v. C oncepcion, 130 S. C t. 3322 (2010); B ruesew itz
v. W yeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233 (3d C ir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. C t. 1734 (2010); C hicanos Por
La C ausa, Inc. v. N apolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom . Cham ber
of C om m erce v. C andelaria, 130 S. C t. 3498 (2010); W illiam son v. M azda M otor of A m ., Inc.,
84 C al. R ptr. 3d 545 (C al. C t. A pp. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. C t. 3348 (2010).
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Commerce Clause and abstention, courts and commentators assume
with little discussion that the federal judiciary is ultimately
responsible for making difficult federalism choices. As this Article
demonstrates, however, preemption is different. While it is routinely acknowledged that the Constitution invests Congress with
the authority to set preemption policy, the oddity and implications of Congress’s power over such an important aspect of “Our
Federalism”3 is routinely overlooked.
Until recently, such an oversight was perhaps understandable.
Historically, Congress has done little to second guess the Court’s
preemption decisions.4 Whether because of apathy, mistake, or the
inability to build majority coalitions, Congress has left the final
decision-making authority for preemption issues largely in the
hands of the federal courts.5 The Court has, in turn, proven
increasingly sympathetic to claims of preemption in recent years,6
thereby allowing defendants otherwise subject to suit under state
law to escape liability. This has shaken Congress out of its typical
disengagement with preemption matters. In response to several
of the Court’s recent preemption decisions, Congress has entered
the preemption fray with uncharacteristic vigor.7 Most notably,
President Obama recently signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).8
3. Younger v. H arris, 401 U .S. 37, 44 (1971).
4. A ccording to one recent study, C ongress explicitly and fully overrode only 2 out of 127
preem ption decisions issued by the Court betw een the C ourt’s 1983 and 2003 Term s. See
N ote, N ew E vidence on the Presum ption Against Preem ption: An E m pirical Study of
C ongressional R esponses to Suprem e C ourt Preem ption D ecisions, 120 H ARV . L. R EV . 1604,
1612-13 (2007). B ut cf. D odd-Frank W all Street R eform and Consum er Protection A ct, Pub.
L. N o. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as am ended in scattered sections of 12 U .S.C .)
(im plicitly overruling the Suprem e C ourt’s holding in W atters v. W achovia B ank, N .A., 550
U .S. 1 (2006), that state m ortgage lending law s do not apply to state-chartered affiliates and
subsidiaries of national banks).
5. See generally Jam elle C . Sharpe, Tow ard (A) Faithful Agency in the Suprem e C ourt’s
Preem ption Jurisprudence, 18 G EO . M ASON L. R EV . 367 (2011) (scrutinizing the Suprem e
C ourt’s control over the form ulation of preem ption policy).
6. See infra Part II.C .
7. For exam ple, in 2009, eighteen m em bers of the U nited States Senate sponsored the
M edical Device Safety A ct of 2009. S. 549, 111th C ong. (2009). The purpose of the bill w as to
“correct the Suprem e C ourt’s decision in R iegel v. M edtronic, w hich m isconstrued the intent
of C ongress and cut off access to our N ation’s courts for citizens injured or killed by defective
m edical devices.” 155 C ONG . R EC . S1861 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2009) (statem ent of Sen. Leahy).
8. Pub. L. N o. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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Among other things, this sweeping legislation attempts to reverse
the twenty-year expansion of federal preemption in the area of
national banking and federal thrift regulation.9
The question that this Article addresses, and one that has thus
far received no significant attention in the literature, is how
Congress can best achieve its federal preemption policy-making
goals. If Congress has any interest in what its substantive preemption policies should be, it must also be interested in who is primarily
responsible for implementing those policies. Given that preemption
involves a host of detailed, context-specific, and often unanticipated
policy judgments, Congress has no choice but to delegate some
responsibility for its development and management to other governmental departments.10 More specifically, Congress must make a
strategic choice to select the Court,11 administrative agencies, or
some combination of the two to fill out the details of its preemption
preferences. Determining how to make this choice is not straightforward. Recent institutional choice approaches to preemption have
analyzed and compared the institutional competencies of Congress,
the Court, and administrative agencies. Such analyses have suggested, for example, that the Court is better suited to make some
preemption policy because it is better equipped to answer constitutional federalism questions.12 They have also suggested that agencies may be preferable because of their greater familiarity with the
statutes they enforce, their superior understanding of the industries

9. See infra Part III.A .
10. See Thom as W . M errill, Preem ption and Institutional C hoice, 102 N W . U . L. R EV . 727,
754 (2008); Sharpe, supra note 5, at 369.
11. See infra Part I.C .1. This A rticle assum es that congressional delegation of preem ption
policy to courts falls prim arily to federal courts and, w ithin the federal judiciary, the Suprem e
C ourt controls that delegation. It should be noted, how ever, that state courts m ust also
answ er preem ption questions w ithin their jurisdiction. M oreover, there is reason to believe
that approaches to preem ption taken by state courts m ay differ from those taken by their
federal counterparts. See K eith N . H ylton, Preem ption and Products Liability: A Positive
Theory, 16 S UP. C T. E CON . R EV . 205, 244, 247 (2008) (conducting em pirical study on a data set
of 300 state court products liability preem ption decisions and concluding that “federal courts
are considerably m ore likely to find preem ption than are state courts”); C atherine M . Sharkey,
Federalism in Action: FDA R egulatory Preem ption in Pharm aceutical C ases in State Versus
Federal C ourt, 15 J.L. & P OL’Y 1013, 1021-46 (2007) (asserting that state courts are m ore
likely than federal courts to reject expansive preem ption argum ents, w hereas federal courts
are m ore likely than state courts to defer to agency preem ption argum ents).
12. See M errill, supra note 10, at 757; Sharpe, supra note 5, at 434.
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they regulate, or their greater analytical sophistication.13 What
these approaches hold in common is their assumption that Congress
has “punted” the preemption issue to courts or to agencies, and
hence the analysis of preemption should begin with the capacities
of courts and agencies to resolve preemption problems.
While comparative institutional advantage is certainly an important factor in allocating preemption policy-making business, it
cannot be the only factor. But it is here that the typical institutional
choice approach elides something very important: Congress has an
interest not only in what substantive preemption policy should be,
but also in who should be primarily responsible for implementing
that policy. In other words, there is a delegation choice to be made
by Congress for which the literature does not fully account, and this
choice is informed by distinctly congressional interests.
In making the delegation choice, Congress depends a great deal
on its ability to monitor and influence judicial and agency implementations of its preemption policies. Such monitoring helps
Congress to maximize policy conformance and to minimize policy
drift. Generally speaking, Congress has access to an array of formal
and informal mechanisms to police delegations of policy-making
authority to administrative agencies. Through committee hearings,
promised budget appropriations and threatened cuts, letters, and
phone calls, members of Congress have numerous means by which
to guide agency decision making after enacting legislation. 14

13. See M errill, supra note 10, at 755; C atherine M . Sharkey, Products Liability
Preem ption: An Institutional Approach, 76 G EO . W ASH . L. R EV . 449, 485-86 (2008); Sharpe,
supra note 5, at 428-29.
14. See L EWIS F ISHER , T HE P OLITICS OF S HARED P OWER: C ONGRESS AND THE E XECUTIVE
(4th ed. 1998). To be clear, it is not the goal of this A rticle to explore the effectiveness of
C ongress's agency m onitoring tools relative to the President or to the nongovernm ental
constituencies that agencies are often thought to serve. A ccordingly, this A rticle does not
debate the effectiveness of congressional m onitoring in the face of contradictory interest group
pressures placed on agencies. In any event, capture by regulated industries is certainly a
concern w hen delegating policy im plem entation authority to adm inistrative agencies, though
the actual extent of this problem is debatable. C om pare Thom as W . M errill, C apture Theory
and the C ourts: 1967-1983, 72 C HI.-K ENT L. R EV . 1039, 1050-52 (1997) (observing that agency
capture and its centrality is the “pathology of agency governm ent”), w ith David B . Spence, The
Shadow of the R ational Polluter: R ethinking the R ole of R ational Actor M odels in
E nvironm ental Law , 89 C ALIF. L. R EV . 917, 961 (2001) (“The m ost im portant defect of capture
theory is that it is unsupported by the evidence.”), and M atthew C . Stephenson, Public
R egulation of Private Enforcem ent: T he C ase for E xpanding the R ole of Adm inistrative
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However, the policing mechanisms Congress uses to rein in agency
policymaking are mostly inapplicable to the federal judiciary.15 In
fact, when dealing with courts, Congress is generally limited to two
such mechanisms—the creation of legislative history and the threat
of legislative override—neither of which is effective in most
situations.16 As a result, Congress can assert little post-enactment
control when it delegates policy-making power to federal courts.
Nevertheless, the federal courts are frequently left to implement
Congress’s preemption policies. Whether Congress specifies those
policies in statutory text or leaves such details for future delineation,17 it stands to reason that it will want to at least consider
whether it can monitor and influence how the Supreme Court
interprets and implements congressional policies. Judicial interpretation and implementation could otherwise result in outcomes that

Agencies, 91 V A . L. R EV . 93, 130-32 (2005) (arguing that fears of agency capture are often
exaggerated). N or does this A rticle attem pt to com pare C ongress’s influence over agencies,
independent or dependent, to that of the P resident. C f. E lena K agan, Presidential
Adm inistration, 114 H ARV . L. R EV . 2245 (2001) (analyzing congressional and presidential
control over adm inistrative policy m aking).
R ather, m y assertion is that C ongress has m ore effective m eans of correcting agency policy
drift than judicial policy drift. A ccordingly, I am sym pathetic to argum ents m ade by advocates
of “congressional dom inance theory” asserting that C ongress can effectively control
delegations to adm inistrative agencies through ex post controls. S ee Barry R . W eingast &
M ark J. M oran, B ureaucratic D iscretion or Congressional C ontrol? R egulatory Policym aking
by the Federal Trade C om m ission, 91 J. P OL. E CON . 765, 780 (1983). For an excellent sum m ary
of the congressional dom inance theory literature, see J.R . D eShazo & Jody Freem an, T he
C ongressional C om petition to C ontrol Delegated Pow er, 81 T EX . L. R EV . 1443, 1457-59 (2003).
15. C ongress m ay nevertheless have reasons for choosing courts over agencies. For
exam ple, C ongress m ay feel pressured to punish “rogue agencies” that stray from the policies
preferred by C ongress or the public. One w ay to m ete out punishm ent is to subject agencies
to greater judicial scrutiny. C f. Sidney A . Shapiro & R onald F . W right, The Future of the
Adm inistrative Presidency: Turning Adm inistrative Law Inside-O ut, 65 U . M IAMI L. R EV . 577,
584-85 (2011). C ongress m ay also delegate to courts when looking to insulate their policy
choices from interference by future Presidents. The operating assum ption w ould be that
agencies, unless independent, are m ore susceptible to presidential influence than are federal
courts.
16. See infra Part I.C.2.
17. See E hud G uttel & A lon H arel, U ncertainty R evisited: Legal Prediction and Legal
Postdiction, 107 M ICH . L. R EV . 467, 480 (2008) (“R ules and standards m ay both generate
uncertainty. Standards are legal norm s w hose interpretation is provided only ex post by the
courts. Standards, therefore, produce future uncertainty resulting from the indeterm inacy of
the interpretation given to them ex post by the courts. R ules are concrete norm s that leave
no (or little) discretion to decision m akers.”).
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Congress never intended, or actively sought to avoid, leaving
Congress with few options for correcting the judiciary’s “mistakes.”18
To maintain maximum possible control over how the Court
interprets and implements its statutes, Congress must be responsive to two factors when drafting potentially preemptive legislation.
The first is the Court’s preferred method of statutory interpretation,
which indicates the sources of evidence on which the Court will rely
when interpreting congressional legislation.19 Under a purposivist
interpretive approach, the justices may rely on legislative history as
evidence of Congress’s legislative purposes. Congress exercises
tremendous control over legislative history, so judicial reliance on
it shifts control of statutory interpretation away from the Court and
toward Congress.20 Assuming that it is easier for members of
Congress to express their policy preferences in legislative history
than it is for them to reach agreement on specific statutory language, they can adopt broad, vague, or ambiguous language in the
hope that the Court will refer to a statute’s legislative history for
clarification and guidance. Under a textualist interpretive approach,
by contrast, the Justices look to the plain meaning of the legislative
18. W illiam N . E skridge, Jr., O verriding Suprem e C ourt Statutory Interpretation
D ecisions, 101 Y ALE L.J. 331, 338 (1991) (concluding after em pirical study that C ongress
overrides the Suprem e C ourt’s statutory decisions an average of ten tim es per year); C harles
R . Shipan, Interest G roups, Judicial R eview , and the O rigins of B roadcast R egulation, 49
A DMIN . L. R EV . 549, 555 (1997) (“[I]t can be difficult to overturn court decisions. E ven if
m ajorities in both houses w ant to overturn a court decision, they m ay be blocked by
institutional features of Congress. Deference to the courts and congressional inattentiveness
also decrease the likelihood that C ongress w ill overturn a court decision.”).
19. See infra Part II.A .
20. See infra notes 157-81 and accom panying text. C ontrary to the views som etim es
expressed by proponents of textualist m ethods of statutory interpretation, I assum e here that
judicial reliance on legislative history is constitutional. Com pare Stephen J. B reyer, O n the
U ses of Legislative H istory in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. C AL. L. R EV . 845, 862-64 (1992)
(arguing that judicial use of legislative history does not violate the constitutional
requirem ents of bicam eralism and presentm ent in A rticle I, Section 7, or A rticle I, Section 1’s
“vesting” of legislative pow er in C ongress), w ith John M anning, Textualism as N ondelegation
D octrine, 97 C OLUM . L. R EV . 673, 673-76, 684-719, 738-39 (1997) (arguing that judicial reliance
on legislative history violates the constitutional requirem ents of bicam eralism and
presentm ent by allow ing m em bers of Congress to resolve statutory am biguities after
enactm ent). I also assum e that legislative history is produced by representative subgroups
of C ongress that can, w ith varying degrees of legitim acy, speak on behalf of the body as a
w hole. See W illiam N . E skridge, Jr., Legislative H istory Values, 66 C HI.-K ENT L. R EV . 365,
382-83 (1990) (describing theory of legislative intent under w hich C ongress im plicitly and
legitim ately delegates clarification of am biguous statutes to com m ittees and sponsors).
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text and disregard legislative history. Settling on precise statutory
text may become much more important in this context, because
textualism allows Congress fewer opportunities to use legislative
history to influence statutory interpretation after legislation is
enacted.21 In either case, where the Court looks for evidence of
statutory meaning should play an important role in how Congress
drafts its legislative text.
The second factor Congress must consider is the Supreme Court’s
predisposition toward or against preemption. The Court has adopted
what this Article terms a “Centralization Default” in its preemption
cases,22 which leads the Court to find that state law is preempted in
the absence of clear and contrary instructions from Congress.23
Recognition of the Default is critical because Congress must know
whether it is working with or against judicial preemption policy
preferences when drafting legislation. Coupled with the first factor
relating to interpretive methods, the Centralization Default reveals
how Congress can reduce preemption policy drift. Assuming, for
instance, that Congress wants to reduce federal preemption in a
given regulatory arena, it would be unwise to pass legislation in the
form of a broad standard. Doing so would give the Court wide
latitude in interpreting Congress’s intent, because Congress would
have declined to provide specific statutory instructions in the legislative text. Although it is possible that the Court would refer to
legislative history to flesh out the details of the legislation, there is
no guarantee that it would do so.24 Given the Centralization Default,
there is a substantial likelihood that the Court would interpret the
legislation in a way that promotes preemption. Thus, the ultimate
preemption policy outcome would be the opposite of what Congress
intended. To reduce the likelihood that the Court will stray from
congressional preemption policy preferences, Congress must there-

21. See infra Part II.A .
22. H ere, this Article uses the term “default” in a m anner sim ilar to Professor M errill’s
use of the term “default rule”: “[A ] legal presum ption ... about the preem ptive effect of a
federal statute in the absence of a discernable intention of C ongress directing a different
result.” Thom as W . M errill, Preem ption in E nvironm ental Law : Form alism , Federalism
Theory, and D efault Rules, in F EDERAL P REEMPTION : S TATES’ P OWERS, N ATIONAL I NTERESTS
166, 168 (R ichard A . E pstein & M ichael S. G reve eds., 2007).
23. See infra Part II.C .
24. See infra Part II.A .
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fore account for both the Court’s interpretive methods and its
Centralization Default when determining the specificity and content
of its preemption statutes.25
In essence, members of Congress must make a choice between
adopting statutory language that invites a purposivist interpretive
approach and relies on legislative history, or adopting statutory
language that is amenable to a textualist interpretive approach. It
is more difficult to agree on detailed bright-line preemption provisions than it is to agree on broader preemption standards, and so
bright-line provisions are likely to be less comprehensive than a
combination of broad standards and legislative history. Accordingly,
this choice necessarily involves a strategic tradeoff: members of
Congress must decide whether settling for “less” in specific brightline text, or hoping for “more” in legislative history, will ultimately
provide them with greater control over post-enactment statutory
meaning. This Article’s analysis of the Centralization Default and
the Court’s approaches to statutory interpretation informs that
choice. Because of the particular challenges that are posed by monitoring and influencing judicial implementation of congressional
preemption policy, this Article reaches an institutional choice conclusion different from that of several other commentators.26 It
concludes that Congress should be hesitant to delegate preemption
policymaking authority to federal courts unless it has identified and
can account for the Centralization Default. All things being equal,
delegating preemption policy-making responsibility to administrative agencies may be preferable because of the numerous opportunities Congress has to police agency decision making.27

25. This is not to say that the C entralization D efault or the Court’s preferred m ethods of
statutory interpretation are static, im m obile targets. To the contrary, it is perfectly
reasonable to assum e that both m ay change over tim e. H ow ever, this assum ption m akes
congressional identification of the C ourt’s interpretive and federalism assum ptions only
slightly m ore challenging. A s indicated below , the C ourt’s current view s on statutory
interpretation and federalism have evolved quite slow ly. See infra Part II.B . B y contrast,
C ongress is m ore likely to be focused on short-term policy considerations, further reducing the
likelihood that it w ill be caught off-guard by an abrupt change in the C ourt’s approaches to
interpretive m ethods or federalism .
26. See, e.g., M errill, supra note 10, at 759 (“The best solution would seem to be to rely on
courts as the prim ary institution for resolving preem ption controversies.”).
27. See infra Part I.C.2.
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In reaching this conclusion, the Article makes three distinct
contributions. First, it frames the preemption delegation choice
faced by Congress as a strategic one made by its members. In doing
so, the Article demonstrates the importance of congressional
delegation and monitoring, thereby adding a critical step to the
customary institutional choice approach to preemption that focuses
primarily on comparative institutional advantages.
Second, it demonstrates how the Centralization Default poses
particular challenges to Congress’s control of preemption policymaking. More specifically, the Article asserts that the Centralization Default increases the difficulty with which federal legislators
reach agreement on antipreemption legislation. The Default does
this either by forcing greater textual specificity in antipreemption
legislation,28 or by incentivizing copious and persuasive legislative
history indicating Congress’s preemptive intentions.
Finally, the Article puts “legislating preemption” in context by
undertaking one of the first comprehensive analyses of the DoddFrank Act’s controversial national bank preemption provisions.
Broadly speaking, these provisions shift preemption policy implementation away from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and toward the
federal judiciary. This shift may ultimately thwart the Act’s antipreemption thrust, because Congress implemented it in a manner that
fails to take account of post-enactment monitoring options and
Centralization Default considerations.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the doctrinal and
political components of preemption policymaking, and how they
should factor into Congress’s decision to delegate preemption
policymaking authority to the Court or to administrative agencies.
Part II analyzes the constraints on Congress’s ability to influence or
control judicial interpretations of statutory language, and the
centrality of congressional monitoring to managing preemption
policy. It then describes the Centralization Default adopted by the
Court and its effects on Congress’s post-enactment monitoring

28. See John F. M anning, Second-G eneration Textualism , 98 S. C AL. L. R EV. 1287, 1293
n.36 (2010) (“[T]he conventional w isdom holds that legislators m ust expend m ore political
capital to reach agreem ent on statutory text.”).
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options. Part III applies the foregoing analysis to the institutional
choices in the Dodd-Frank Act. A brief conclusion follows.
I. C ONGRESSIONAL M ANAGEMENT OF P REEMPTION
Simply stated, preemption addresses whether, when, and to what
extent Congress displaces state laws and actions with federal law.29
To be sure, there is substantial debate in the scholarly literature
as to which provisions of the Constitution provide the power to
preempt state laws, and which organs of the federal government
are constitutionally invested with that power.30 It is by now black
letter law, however, that the Constitution commits such decisions
to Congress under the Supremacy Clause.31 Accordingly, when preemption issues are framed for judicial resolution, the Supreme
Court has steadfastly maintained that the inquiry is driven by
whether Congress manifested some intent to displace state law with
federal legislation.32 As described in the following subsections, the
fact that congressional intent drives the preemption inquiry has
implications for the shape of preemption doctrine, the likelihood
that Congress will meaningfully and consistently engage preemption problems, and the challenges it faces when it does decide to
engage them.
A. Doctrinal Considerations
Broadly speaking, Congress can engage preemption problems in
one of two ways that the Court will recognize. First, it can expressly
29. C f. M errill, supra note 10, at 731.
30. C om pare id. at 733-37 (arguing that the Suprem acy C lause provides, but does not
lim it, the pow er to preem pt state law to C ongress), w ith Stephen A . G ardbaum , The N ature
of Preem ption, 79 C ORNELL L . R EV . 767, 785 (1994) (arguing that the N ecessary and Proper
C lause is the basis for preem ption power, and that it is exclusively w ielded by C ongress).
31. A ltria G roup, Inc. v. G ood, 555 U .S . 70, 76-77 (2008). M ore broadly, Professor C lark
has argued that congressional control of federalism issues is constitutionally m andated. See
B radford R . C lark, Separation of Pow ers as a Safeguard of Federalism , 79 T EX . L. R EV. 1321,
1330-31 (2001) (asserting that the legislative procedures set forth in the C onstitution protect
state prerogatives by lim iting C ongress’s pow er).
32. G ood, 555 U .S. at 76 (“[I]nquir[ies] into the scope of a statute’s pre-em ptive effect [are]
guided by the rule that ‘[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultim ate touchstone in every preem ption case.’” (quoting M edtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U .S. 470, 485 (1996)) (internal quotation
m arks om itted)); see also W yeth v. Levine, 129 S. C t. 1187, 1194-95 (2009).
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state its preemptive intent in the language of federal statutes that
may overlap or conflict with state laws or actions (express preemption).33 For example, the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA)
specifically forbids states from creating or enforcing cautionary
labeling requirements for hazardous substances that differ in any
way from those established under federal law.34 Thus, a plaintiff
who was burned by ignited vapors emanating from a metal primer
was barred from suing the primer’s manufacturer under state law.35
Permitting state tort claims for failure to warn against the manufacturer based on theories of strict product liability, negligence, and
breach of warranty would have impermissibly imposed primer
labeling requirements different from those already established
under the FHSA.36
Second, Congress can imply its intent to preempt state laws or
actions in a variety of ways. It can, for example, enact such pervasive and detailed legislation targeting a particular industry or form
of conduct that the Court will infer Congress’s intent to occupy the
entire field of regulation, to the clear exclusion of the states (field
preemption).37 Congress can also enact legislation geared toward
serving interests of such particular federal importance that its
effectuation would only be impeded by state regulatory involvement
(obstacle preemption).38 Finally, Congress may enact legislation that
forbids conduct required under state law, or that requires conduct
forbidden under state law, making compliance with both federal and
state law impossible (conflict preemption).39 While the evidence of
33. E .g., C atherine M . Sharkey, Against Freew heeling, E xtratextual O bstacle Preem ption:
Is Justice C larence Thom as the Lone Principled Federalist?, 5 N .Y.U . J.L. & L IBERTY 63, 71
(2010).
34. M ilarese v. R ust-O leum C orp., 244 F.3d 104, 109 (2d C ir. 2001) (“[I]f a hazardous
substance or its packaging is subject to a cautionary labeling requirem ent under [the FH SA ]
designed to protect against a risk of illness or injury associated w ith the substance, no State
... m ay establish or continue in effect a cautionary labeling requirem ent applicable to such
substance or packaging and designed to protect against the sam e risk of illness or injury
unless such cautionary labeling requirem ent is identical to the labeling requirem ent under
[the FH SA ].” (quoting Pub. L. N o. 89-756, § 4(a), 80 Stat. 1303, 1305 (codified as am ended at
15 U .S.C . § 1261 note (b)(1)(A) (2006) (E ffect upon Federal and State Law ))).
35. Id. at 108-09.
36. Id. at 109.
37. G ade v. N at’l Solid W astes M gm t. A ss’n, 505 U .S. 88, 98 (1992).
38. C rosby v. N at’l Foreign Trade C ouncil, 530 U .S. 363, 372-73 (2000).
39. Fla. Lim e & A vocado G row ers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U .S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
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Congress’s intent may vary under each of these approaches, none
involve an explicit statutory instruction by Congress regarding the
primacy of federal or state law.40
Whether Congress’s intent to preempt state law is expressed in
a statute or implied by it, the Court describes its role as being
limited to determining that intent through tools of statutory interpretation.41 Presumably, when administrative agencies are tasked
with promulgating preemption rules, they are also bound by, and
therefore must locate, Congress’s intent. Despite the Court’s insistence to the contrary, however, preemption is not a routine exercise
in statutory interpretation.42 Unlike other instances in which courts
or agencies are asked to determine congressional intent from
statutory text or other sources, preemption necessarily involves
three simultaneous policy considerations. First and foremost are
questions of federalism, which bring to bear the constitutional
sensitivities inherent in the federal-state relationship.43 Second,
corrective justice considerations examine whether the state
remedial laws under which individuals, entities, or interest groups
seek redress for private wrongs will be eliminated to serve some
overriding federal purpose.44 Third, regulatory efficiency considerations compare federally centralized administration with state-

40. See, e.g., Sharkey, supra note 33, at 71.
41. See M errill, supra note 10, at 742.
42. See id. (“The interpretation of a federal statute does not ordinarily entail a judgm ent
nullifying state law , yet that far-reaching result is precisely w hat happens w hen courts apply
preem ption doctrine.”).
43. See Sharpe, supra note 5, at 373. In this vein, there are at least tw o form s in w hich
preem ption federalism can take shape. The first is a procedural federalism , w hich em phasizes
the participation of the states in discussions over w hether their law s should be superseded.
See, e.g., C atherine M . S harkey, Inside Agency Preem ption,110 M ICH . L. R EV . (forthcom ing
2011) (describing the role that state governm ents and state-based interest groups play in
federal adm inistrative preem ption rulem aking). The second is a form alistic federalism , in
w hich areas of regulation are denom inated as federal, local, or com m on a priori. C f. R obert
A . Schapiro, From D ualism to Polyphony, in P REEMPTION C HOICE : T HE T HEORY, L AW , AND
R EALITY OF F EDERALISM ’S C ORE Q UESTION 33, 46-47, 51-52 (W illiam W . B uzbee ed., 2009)
(describing the flaw s in a conception of federalism that attem pts to dem arcate im m utable and
exclusive spheres of federal and state regulatory authority). See generally E DWARD A .
P URCELL, J R ., O RIGINALISM , F EDERALISM , AND THE A MERICAN C ONSTITUTIONAL E NTERPRISE
7-10 (2007) (arguing that no definitive conclusions regarding the balance betw een state and
federal pow er can reasonably be draw n from the C onstitution’s history or text).
44. See Sharpe, supra note 5, at 375-76.
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based decentralized administration to determine the appropriate
means by which to effectuate federal regulatory policy.45
Congress has rarely made clear the extent to which any of these
factors have influenced its preemption policy decisions.46 Moreover,
the proper balance with regard to each consideration—whether to
defer to state as opposed to federal enforcement or to provide
greater or lesser state involvement in federal policymaking, whether
to eliminate causes of action for one set of potential plaintiffs but
not for another, or whether to centralize or decentralize particular
regulatory activities—is not susceptible to immutable rules that
clearly differentiate between correct or incorrect resolutions.47 The
three policy considerations are, in this sense, arbitrary; they cannot
be definitively and objectively derived from binding rules of logic or
law.48 When the Court or administrative agencies face preemption
questions, they are therefore left to piece together Congress’s intent
from available evidence or, as is more often the case, fill in the gaps
with their own views on federalism, corrective justice, and regulatory efficiency.49
A recent example drawn from the Court’s products liability preemption jurisprudence illustrates the point. In Riegel v. Medtronic,
Inc., the Court was asked to decide whether Congress intended to
include the standards underlying state common law tort claims in
its definition of “requirements” under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA).50 Under the MDA’s express preemption
clause, states are prohibited from imposing medical device design
45. Id. at 376-77.
46. C atherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ER ISA Preem ption?: A C ase
Study of the Failure of Textualism , 33 H ARV . J. ON L EGIS. 35, 43 (1996) (“C ongress often does
not attem pt to expressly articulate its intent regarding preem ption.”); Sharkey, supra note
13, at 450-51 (observing that Congress frequently shifts policy questions relating to products
liability preem ption to courts or adm inistrative agencies). It is conventional w isdom in the
academ y that C ongress focuses on the core purposes of the legislation it enacts and not on
ancillary consequences such as preem ption. See Fisk, supra, at 102-03 (observing that a
preem ption clause enacted by C ongress can be the product of “last-m inute com prom ise in a
m assive piece of new legislation”).
47. See Sharpe, supra note 5, at 374.
48. See H octor v. U .S. D ep’t of A gric., 82 F.3d 165, 170 (7th C ir. 1996) (describing as
“arbitrary” rules prom ulgated in the absence of clear and rational justifications derived from
the statutes on w hich they are based).
49. See Sharpe, supra note 5, at 362.
50. 552 U .S. 312, 323 (2008).
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requirements that are “different from, or in addition to” the safety
and effectiveness standards set by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).51 Although the MDA’s preemptive scope turns in this
instance on which state laws, regulations, or decisions constitute
“requirements,” Congress did not define the term anywhere in the
Act.52 Moreover, the Court did not accept as definitive the FDA’s
construal of the term, in effect concluding that Congress had not
delegated that responsibility to the FDA.53 Rather, the Court proceeded as though Congress implicitly delegated to it the task of
determining when state products liability laws are displaced by the
FDA-promulgated medical device requirements.54 As is typical of its
preemption clauses, Congress provided no express guidance on how
to undertake this delegated task.
A majority of the Justices resorted to the sources of intent
evidence prescribed by textualist interpretive methods, such as
dictionary definitions, a legal treatise, and the MDA’s language.55 In
doing so, the Court concluded that “requirements” did include state
common law and that Congress did in fact intend to preempt the
plaintiff ’s claim.56 What is clear from the opinion is that the Court
did more than simply fill in the definition of “requirement”; it chose
that definition based in large part on its assumptions that Congress
wanted to prioritize regulatory efficiency concerns over corrective
justice concerns and that centralized decision making by the FDA
was the appropriate means of addressing those concerns.57
In a revealing observation, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated that “excluding common-law duties from the scope of
pre-emption would make little sense” because “[a state] jury ... sees
only the cost of a more dangerous design, and is not concerned with
its benefits; the patients who reaped those benefits are not repre-

51. Id. at 316 (quoting 21 U .S.C. § 360k(a)(1) (2006)).
52. See id. at 324-25.
53. See id. at 322 (observing that its interpretation of the M D A ’s preem ption provision is
only “substantially inform ed” by the FD A ’s regulations).
54. See M argaret H . Lem os, The C onsequences of C ongress’s C hoice of Delegate: Judicial
and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 V AND . L. R EV . 363, 372 (2010) (noting that an
am biguous term is tantam ount to delegation of authority to courts).
55. R iegel, 552 U .S. at 326, 328-30.
56. Id. at 324-25.
57. Id.
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sented in court.”58 A federal agency like the FDA, by contrast, “could
at least be expected to apply cost-benefit analysis.”59 As demonstrated by Justice Stevens in his concurrence and by Justice
Ginsburg in her dissent, the Court could have easily found that the
MDA did not preempt the plaintiff ’s claim by relying on the MDA’s
legislative history, which the plaintiff argued would have shown
that Congress prioritized corrective justice over regulatory efficiency.60 In either case, the Court felt compelled to make this policy
choice itself because Congress provided no definitive guidance on
which preemption factors were most important in reaching the
agreement that led to the MDA’s enactment.
B. Practical and Political Considerations
For several reasons, Congress either does not or cannot make all
of the decisions needed to seamlessly implement its preemption
policy. From a mechanical rule-making perspective, the foresight
needed to anticipate all of the situations in which preemption
questions might arise, and to determine how to deal with them, is
simply beyond the capabilities of any legislative body; attempts at
creating any such all-encompassing codes are futile.61 Even if
Congress could understand how its legislation will affect the laws
of all fifty states, those states are well within their rights to change
their laws at any time.62 Further, Congress’s administrative resources are limited; it cannot identify and respond to all of the

58. Id. at 325.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 331 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 335-37 (G insburg, J., dissenting). E ven
though Justice Stevens concluded in R iegel that com m on law tort claim s constitute
“requirem ents” under the M D A , he seem ed to do so despite his previously expressed view of
the m atter. Id. at 331-33 (Stevens, J., concurring). In M edtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the predecessor
case to R iegel, Justice Stevens characterized the notion that the M D A proscribed all state tort
claim s against m edical device m anufacturers as both “unpersuasive” and “im plausible.” 518
U .S. 470, 487 (1996) (plurality opinion). H ow ever, only four justices signed on to that part of
the opinion. Id. at 487-91.
61. See Fisk, supra note 46, at 102 (“C ongress sim ply cannot anticipate all preem ption
problem s w hen it enacts a far-reaching law that displaces a substantial am ount of state
law.”).
62. See id. at 100 (discussing how H aw aii am ended its H ealth C are Act despite having
received an express preem ption exem ption from Congress).
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changes that may occur in the areas it has chosen to regulate.63
Other plausible pitfalls include time pressures, legitimate drafting
challenges, mistakes, and incompetence.64 Procedurally, the distribution of agenda-setting authority among various committees and
party leaders within and outside of Congress can effectively thwart
attempts to override judicial decisions, even when a majority of
members would favor such actions.65
From a purely political perspective, legislators are apt to delegate
to courts or agencies those policy decisions that garner them the
least in electoral gains.66 Ambiguity or silence in legislative
language may therefore be purposeful, as legislative coalitions,
unable to agree on all aspects of a particular proposal, may choose
instead to omit or to muddle disputed features, and thereby leave
their settlement to another day.67 Similarly, ambiguous statutory
language may be the shrewd legislator’s response to competing
interest group pressures; leaving a disputed policy choice unresolved
may enable the legislator to shift the political costs of decision to
the courts or to an administrative agency that will ultimately be
charged with resolving it.68 Moreover, it is possible that legislators
will delegate the implementation of policies they fully expect to fail.
Doing so grants them two electoral benefits. They gain the first by
enacting legislation that is seemingly responsive to the concerns of
the constituencies they are trying to please.69 They gain the second

63. See generally R ANDALL B . R IPLEY & G RACE A . F RANKLIN , C ONGRESS, THE
B UREAUCRACY , AND P UBLIC P OLICY 12 (W adsw orth, Inc., 5th ed. 1991) (observing that the size
and com plexity of federal regulation prevents C ongress from im plem enting it on its ow n).
64. See D aniel B . R odriguez, Statutory Interpretation and Political Advantage, 12 I NT’L
R EV . L. & E CON . 217, 220 (1992).
65. See A m y Coney B arrett, Substantive C anons and Faithful Agency, 90 B .U . L. R EV. 109,
112 n.5 (2010) (“A b ill m ust com pete for space and priority on the congressional agenda. It
m ust navigate num erous ‘vetogates,’ including com m ittee votes, the threat of Senate
filibuster, and the threat of presidential veto. Passage through each of these points requires
both strategic choice and com prom ise.”); B rian A. M arks, A M odel of Judicial Influence of
C ongressional Policym aking: Grove C ity College v. B ell 5-7 (H oover Inst., W orking Paper N o.
P-88-7, 1988), available at http://w w w .law .northw estern.edu/searlecenter/papers/M arks_A _
M odel_of_Judicial_88.pdf.
66. See R IPLEY & F RANKLIN , supra note 63, at 13.
67. See Rodriguez, supra note 64, at 218.
68. See R IPLEY & F RANKLIN , supra note 63, at 13. It is even possible that adm inistrative
agencies w ould invite such an outcom e. R odriguez, supra note 64, at 220.
69. See Rodriguez, supra note 64, at 218.
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when they intervene—through public criticism, constituent service,
or new legislation—to correct the implementation failures of their
delegates.70
The fact that preemption shifts the balance of regulatory power
away from states and toward the federal government can make it
highly unpopular with the voters and elected officials in a congressperson’s or a senator’s home district or state.71 In addition,
federal preemption frequently results in the weakening or the
elimination of state and federal judicial remedies, which rallies
powerful interests that range from consumer advocacy groups to the
plaintiffs’ bar.72 At the same time, the business community and
those that advocate on their behalf are frequently consumers of
federal preemption, which they claim reduces the costs of regulatory
compliance by eliminating the redundancy of simultaneous state
and federal regulation.73 Given the difficulties endemic to pleasing
both pro- and antipreemption interest groups, and presuming that
members of Congress perceive as credible at least some of the
threats of reprisal levied at them by both groups, one would expect
federal legislators to generally avoid expending political capital to
adopt clear and comprehensive preemption legislation. 74 Even
assuming that some federal legislators are sufficiently publicminded to subordinate personal electoral gains to principles such as
corrective justice or constitutional federalism, a minority of selfinterested lawmakers would be sufficient to make enacting those
principles in clear and comprehensive preemption legislation
politically infeasible.75 The difficulty of appeasing both pro- and
70. See M ORRIS P. F IORINA , C ONGRESS: K EYSTONE OF THE W ASHINGTON E STABLISHMENT
48 (1977).
71. Id. To be sure, state-based interest groups can effectively lobby against preem ption.
C f. J AMES I. O ’R EILLY , F EDERAL P REMPTION OF S TATE AND L OCAL L AW 48-49 (2006) (describing
how state and local governm ents rally federal representatives against the adoption of
adm inistrative agency regulations that w ould have preem ptive effect).
72. See M ark E . G udnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public C onsum er
Protection Law in the U nited States: Their E ffect on Litigation and E nforcem ent, 24 G A . S T.
U . L. R EV . 663, 690 (2008); Sharpe, supra note 5, at 375-76 (discussing how the predispositions
of Suprem e Court Justices in preem ption cases can result in the preservation or elim ination
of private rights of action).
73. R oderick M . H ills, Jr., Against Preem ption: H ow Federalism C an Im prove the N ational
Legislative Process, 82 N .Y.U . L. R EV . 1, 19-20 (2007).
74. Id. at 28.
75. About the Senate C om m ittee System , U .S. S ENATE , http://w w w .senate.gov/general/
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antipreemption constituencies will thus increase the likelihood that
Congress will purposely ignore the issue, make vague pronouncements that do not offend competing interest groups, and/or delegate
decision-making responsibility to another branch of government.76
C. Delegation and Monitoring Considerations
1. Limitations on Congress’s Choice of Delegate
Congressional hesitancy in the preemption context can result not
only in vague or ambiguous preemption directives but also in vague
or ambiguous delegations of preemption authority. The problem of
vague delegations in the preemption context has manifested itself
in scholarly debates regarding the scope of Congress’s delegation
authority and in the Supreme Court’s indecision over the level of
deference courts should afford an agency’s preemption determinations. Scholars have questioned whether Congress possesses the
constitutional authority to delegate preemption decisions to administrative agencies,77 and hence whether the only appropriate delegate for such questions is the judiciary. Others have asserted that,
constitutional issues aside, agencies simply lack the institutional
competence to determine the appropriate balance between state and

com m on/generic/about_com m ittees.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2011) (“Several thousand bills
and resolutions are referred to com m ittees during each 2-year Congress. C om m ittees select
a sm all percentage for consideration, and those not addressed often receive no further
action.”); see also H ow O ur Law s are M ade, L IBRARY OF C ONGRESS, http://thom as.loc.gov/hom e/
lawsm ade.bysec/considbycom m .htm l (last visited Sept. 23, 2011) (“A com m ittee m ay table a
bill or fail to take action on it, thereby preventing its report to the H ouse.”).
76. See H ills, supra note 73, at 28 (noting that preem ption can create a vigorous and
public debate, w hich C ongress “w ould prefer to avoid”).
77. See, e.g., C ass R . S unstein, N ondelegation C anons, 67 U . C HI. L. R EV . 315, 331 n.81
(2000) (“It is not entirely clear w hether an agency m ight be able to decide the [preem ption]
question if C ongress expressly said that the agency is perm itted to do so.”). That being said,
the fecklessness of the C ourt’s nondelegation doctrine is not likely to pose a threat to
C ongress’s preem ption delegations. See M argaret H . Lem os, The O ther D elegate: Judicially
Adm inistered Statutes and the N ondelegation D octrine, 81 S. C AL. L. R EV . 405, 435-36 (2008)
(“O nly if C ongress em pow ers an agency to m ake law w ithout supplying an ‘intelligible
principle’ has C ongress crossed the constitutional line by giving aw ay the nondelegable core
of legislative pow er.”).

184

W ILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:163

federal power, again making the courts Congress’s only viable
option.78
We see this issue play out in the Court’s struggles with the level
of deference courts should afford agencies when those agencies
interpret statutory language in a way that displaces state law. From
an institutional choice perspective, the deference issue is critical. If
the Court decides that an agency’s preemption decisions are worthy
of only Skidmore deference,79 it has effectively concluded that the
courts are primarily responsible for implementing Congress’s
preemption policies. Although courts must consider an agency’s
views under Skidmore, they are free to reject those views to the
extent they are unpersuasive. By contrast, if the Court accords an
agency’s views Chevron deference,80 then it has inferred that
Congress wanted to make the agency primarily responsible for
determining Congress’s preemptive intent.81
Although the issue is certainly not free from doubt, it appears
from the Supreme Court’s engagement with the deference issue that
it is not yet poised to prevent Congress from delegating preemption
decisions to federal agencies. However, the Court may have already
imposed requirements for how Congress indicates its delegation
choice. In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. and Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the
78. See, e.g., N ina A . M endelson, A Presum ption Against Agency Preem ption, 102 N W . U .
L. R EV . 695, 706-07, 717-18, 722-25 (2008) (arguing that agencies lack the institutional
com petence and statutory guidance required to m ake inform ed choices on questions of state
autonom y).
79. U nder Skidm ore deference, “[t]he w eight of [an agency’s views] in a particular case
w ill depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
its consistency w ith earlier and later pronouncem ents, and all those factors w hich give it
pow er to persuade, if lacking pow er to control.” Skidm ore v. Sw ift & C o., 323 U .S. 134, 140
(1944). W hile there is disagreem ent about the precise contours of the Skidm ore analysis, it
is clear that “Skidm ore allow s a review ing court to be the final arbiter of w hether the agency’s
interpretation is persuasive but specifies som e factors and allows for the existence of others
that a court should consider in evaluating the agency’s case.” Kristin E . H ickm an, The N eed
for M ead: R ejecting Tax E xceptionalism in Judicial D eference, 90 M INN . L. R EV . 1537, 1552
(2006).
80. W ILLIAM F. F UNK & R ICHARD H . S EAMON, A DMINISTRATIVE L AW 285 (3d ed. 2009) (“The
C hevron doctrine has com e to be associated w ith the idea that courts defer to an agency’s
interpretation of law and that this deference is strong deference, allow ing agencies
substantial leew ay in their interpretations.”).
81. See Lem os, supra note 77, at 429 (“U nder C hevron, courts treat am biguity in an
agency-adm inistered statute as im plicit evidence of C ongress’s intention to delegate
lawm aking authority to the agency.”).
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Court suggested that an agency’s preemption determinations should
be accorded Skidmore deference (or at least something less than
Chevron deference).82 In Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., it expressly refused to address the deference question.83 In Wyeth v.
Levine,84 Justice Stevens, writing for the five-Justice majority,85
noted that the Court has in prior decisions “given ‘some weight’ to
an agency’s views about the impact of tort law on federal objectives
when ‘the subject matter is technical and the relevant history and
background are complex and extensive.’”86 From this observation, it
appears that the Court will default to Skidmore deference to an
agency’s preemption determinations, at least where state common
law is involved, and at least where the agency’s technical core
competencies are implicated. The weight the Court accords “the
agency’s explanation of state law’s impact on the federal scheme
[will accordingly] depend[ ] on its thoroughness, consistency, and
persuasiveness.”87 In keeping with this Skidmore default, Justice
Stevens also preserved the possibility that Congress could expressly
delegate preemption decision-making authority to an administrative
agency. He observed that “agencies have no special authority to
pronounce on pre-emption absent delegation by Congress.”88

82. 552 U .S. 312, 326-27 (2008); 518 U .S. 470, 495 (1996). The C ourt’s opinion in Lohr is
particularly curious in this regard. The C ourt specifically acknow ledged conditions that w ould
seem ingly m ake C hevron deference appropriate: that § 360k of the M D A w as am biguous, that
“C ongress ha[d] given the FD A a unique role in determ ining the scope of § 360k’s pre-em ptive
effect,” and that “the [F D A w as] uniquely qualified to determ ine w hether a particular form
of state law [stood] as an obstacle to the accom plishm ent and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of C ongress ... and therefore w hether it should be preem pted.” 518 U .S. at 496
(internal quotations om itted). The C ourt even cited C hevron in its analysis. See id.
N evertheless, it did not state that it m ust defer to the FD A ’s conclusions regarding § 360k’s
preem ptive scope. R ather, it stated that its conclusions are only “substantially inform ed” by
the FD A ’s interpretation of the statute. Id.
83. 550 U .S. 1, 20-21 (2006).
84. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
85. Though he concurred in the C ourt’s decision, Justice Thom as did not agree w ith the
C ourt’s reasoning. See id. at 1205 (Thom as, J., concurring) (“I write separately, how ever,
because I cannot join the m ajority’s im plicit endorsem ent of far-reaching im plied pre-em ption
doctrines.”).
86. Id. at 1201 (alteration om itted) (quoting G eier v. Am . H onda M otor C o., 529 U .S. 861,
883 (2000)).
87. Id. (citing U nited States v. M ead C orp., 533 U .S. 218, 234-35 (2001); Skidm ore v. Swift
& C o., 323 U .S. 134, 140 (1944)).
88. W yeth, 129 S. C t. at 1201 (em phasis added).
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It therefore appears that the Court will assume Congress has
delegated preemption decisions to the judiciary and that an agency’s
views on the matter will be informative but not dispositive. As
Professor Metzger has recently observed, it seems that “Wyeth
insist[s] that conclusions of preemptive effect are ultimately for the
courts to make in their independent judgment, at least absent an
express delegation to an agency of preemptive authority.” 89 W hile
Justice Stevens did not explicitly address whether such a delegation
could ever be implied from an express preemption clause, the
Court’s decision almost four months later in Cuomo v. Clearing
House Ass’n left open that possibility.90 There, the Court flirted with
applying the Chevron framework to the OCC’s interpretation of the
term “visitorial powers” without fully committing to it, fully rejecting it, or explicitly engaging in a “Chevron Step Zero” analysis.91
Although the Court in Cuomo had to construe the National Bank
Act’s (NBA) express preemption provision, it declined to indicate
whether Congress had delegated preemption authority to the OCC
through that provision. It may be that the difference between the
Court’s flirtation with Chevron deference in Cuomo and its seeming
rejection of it in Wyeth can be explained by Congress’s inclusion of
an express preemption clause in the NBA and its exclusion of such
a clause in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.92 If that is the case,
however, it is puzzling that the Court referred to the Chevron
framework in neither Lohr nor Riegel, both of which involved the

89. G illian E . M etzger, Federalism and Federal Agency R eform , 111 C OLUM . L. R EV . 1, 15
(2011).
90. 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
91. Id. at 2715; see M etzger, supra note 89, at 16 (“[T]the m ajority opinion [in C uom o]
deviates from ordinary Chevron review by refusing to defer to the OCC's regulation
interpreting ‘visitorial pow ers’ in the N B A , despite acknow ledging that this term was
am biguous and the regulation had been prom ulgated using full notice-and-com m ent
procedures.”). The C ourt ultim ately rejected the O C C ’s interpretation as unreasonable. See
C uom o, 129 S. C t. at 2724 (Thom as, J., concurring). O ne could argue that the C ourt did not
consider C hevron deference a viable option, given the fuzziness of its analysis and its im plicit
refusal to dism iss Chevron analysis as the appropriate fram ew ork for answ ering the deference
question. See Sharkey, supra note 33, at 106 & n.230 (asserting that the C ourt did not m ove
beyond C hevron Step O ne, and hence did not grant the O C C Chevron deference, because it
resolved the “visitorial pow ers” question on the plain term s of the N B A ).
92. See W yeth, 129 S. C t. at 1196 (observing that C ongress “declined to enact” an express
preem ption provision applicable to prescription drug regulation).
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application of the MDA’s express preemption clause.93 Nevertheless,
it would seem that the Court will certainly recognize express congressional delegations of preemption authority—and hence apply
Chevron analysis—when a statute specifically invests a federal
agency with that authority. Otherwise, the Court will likely assume
that Congress intended the judiciary to be its primary preemption
delegate.
2. The Importance of Congressional Monitoring
Assuming that congressional delegation of some preemption
policymaking is all but inevitable, and assuming that there are few,
if any, constitutional constraints on Congress’s choice of delegate,
the question becomes how Congress should choose its delegate.
Scholars most often answer this question by analyzing the strengths
and weaknesses of the two primary institutional candidates: the
federal courts, usually the Supreme Court, and federal agencies. For
example, Professor Merrill has proffered what is essentially a twostep analysis for the closely related issue of whether Congress, the
Court, or an agency is best suited to manage preemption issues. He
first identifies preemption’s core considerations from an institutional choice perspective, which in his view include “constitutional,
interpretational, and pragmatic variables.”94 He then assesses the
comparative advantages and disadvantages of Congress, the courts,
and agencies in dealing with each variable.95 Similarly, Professor
Sharkey has argued that questions of institutional choice in the
products liability preemption context should be answered by courts,
plied with empirical data from expert federal agencies like the
FDA.96 Other commentators have employed similar analyses that
focus on whether different branches of the federal government are
institutionally competent to make substantive preemption policy
choices,97 though their conclusions vary.
93. R iegel v. M edtronic, Inc., 552 U .S. 312, 316 (2008); M edtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U .S.
470, 482 (1996).
94. M errill, supra note 10, at 730.
95. Id. at 744-59.
96. Sharkey, supra note 13, at 485-91.
97. See, e.g., Brian G alle & M ark Seidenfeld, Adm inistrative Law ’s Federalism :
Preem ption, D elegation, and Agencies at the E dge of Federal Pow er, 57 D UKE L.J. 1933, 1948
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To be sure, these thoughtful analyses highlight a critical component of preemption policy management: an unreasonable expectation of an institution’s decisional capacities could thwart the
effective implementation of any policy, preemption policy included.98
Along these lines, I have described elsewhere how “institutional
singularity” has dominated the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence. Although the Court’s decisions rhetorically assume that
Congress is solely responsible for controlling the shape of federal
preemption policy, in practice the Court itself attempts to exercise
such control.99 In either case, the Court’s operative assumption is
that a single branch of the federal government can effectively
manage the confluence of policy issues that preemption routinely
presents.100 Such institutional singularity not only disregards
Congress’s critical role as federal preemption policy coordinator,101
but it also disregards important strategic factors that members of
Congress likely consider when delegating preemption policy implementation to the executive and judicial branches.102 A critical
addition to this account is the centrality of Congress’s role in
coordinating and delegating preemption policy formation and
implementation.
Even if members of Congress choose to delegate preemption policy
implementation based primarily on how well courts and agencies
address federalism, corrective justice, and regulatory efficiency
issues, it stands to reason that those members would still wish to
retain some means of correction and adjustment. Stated differently,
the need to delegate some preemption policymaking and implementation responsibility does not also connote, let alone necessitate,
congressional abdication of preemption policymaking to courts or
agencies. Given an increasing scholarly and popular interest in
(2008) (analyzing the com parative institutional com petence of courts and agencies to m anage
federalism concerns).
98. See M errill, supra note 10, at 753-59 (describing the com parative strengths and
w eaknesses of C ongress, the courts, and adm inistrative agencies in form ulating and
im plem enting federal preem ption policy); cf. Sharkey, supra note 13, at 485-502 (describing
the institutional advantages of agencies in m aking preem ption determ inations, and the role
that courts can play in lim iting agency preem ptive pow er).
99. See Sharpe, supra note 5, at 406-07.
100. See id. at 369.
101. See id. at 426-28.
102. See id. at 426-34.
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preemption issues,103 it is perhaps unrealistic to expect members of
Congress to leave its management wholly to the other branches of
the federal government. An approach to analyzing the institutional
choice of preemption that does not account for congressional
delegation is, therefore, incomplete.
If one assumes that Congress prefers that the results produced by
its legislation trend in a particular policy direction, it would stand
to reason that Congress should have some idea when drafting it
as to how courts or agencies would construe that legislation. Stated
differently, Congress would be expected to provide delegates with
discretion if it is generally confident that the delegate will, in
the end, effect congressionally selected policy goals. By contrast,
Congress would be expected to provide its delegates with little
discretion if those delegates are not likely to give effect to congressional policy choices.104 It would be sensible therefore for Congress
to try to retain some powers of correction and influence after the
legislative language has been settled upon and the delegation has
been made.105
As a general matter, Congress can use ex ante or ex post control
mechanisms to monitor how the governmental agents to which it
delegates the implementation of its legislative mandates conform to
congressional goals.106 The primary ex ante control mechanism is
legislative text which, broadly speaking, can take two forms. First,
Congress can clearly and comprehensively enumerate the considerations that go into implementing its legislation. If effectively
executed, this method reduces the interpretive latitude of the
implementing agent and, presumably, produces results more in

103. See R obert A . Schapiro, M onophonic Preem ption, 102 N W . U . L. R EV . 811, 811 (2008)
(“M uch scholarly and public attention has now turned to another aspect of the C ourt's
federalism jurisprudence, the preem ption of state law .”).
104. See T HEODORE J. L OWI, T HE E ND OF L IBERALISM 92-94 (2d ed. 1979) (noting that
delegation of authority needs to be checked, guided, and safeguarded).
105. A t a m inim um , m em bers of C ongress, w ho are presum ably heavily influenced by
changes in public opinion, w ould w ant to secure for them selves the option of changing their
view s regarding the policies underlying enacted legislation and to have those changes
reflected in the w ays enacted legislation is interpreted and im plem ented. See R odriguez,
supra note 64, at 218.
106. See D AVID E PSTEIN & S HARYN O ’H ALLORAN , D ELEGATING P OWER: A T RANSACTION C OST
P OLITICS A PPROACH TO P OLICY M AKING U NDER S EPARATE P OWERS 25 (1999).
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keeping with legislative intent.107 One such attempt at detailed
instruction is section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976, which
specifically enumerates the circumstances under which, and the
extent to which, federal law displaces state law.108 Another is section
514 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
which has produced less than stellar results.109
Alternatively, Congress can enact broad implementing language
that, on its face, welcomes some measure of interpretive latitude.
For example, section 1044(b)(1)(B) of the Dodd-Frank Act instructs
courts and the OCC to apply implied conflict and obstacle preemption doctrines when determining the applicability of state laws to
national bank and federal thrift activities.110 In drafting this section,
Congress essentially left the details of preemption policy to future
determination.111 Scholars have uniformly concluded that these
implied preemption doctrines, with one possible exception,112 invite
and often require a substantial measure of judicial policymaking.113
In other words, the instruction to apply these implied preemption
doctrines is tantamount to an implicit delegation of authority to the
courts and stands in stark contrast to the ex ante legislative control
created by specifically detailed legislative language. Instead of
107. See id. at 26 (arguing that C ongress can control bureaucratic drift, the tendency of
agencies to ignore congressional policy preferences in favor of their ow n, by “passing specific,
detail-filled legislation”). O f course, the increased com plexity of such a statute could increase
the rate of erroneous application, thus creating bureaucratic drift of a different kind.
108. 17 U .S.C . § 301 (1998).
109. 29 U .S.C . § 1144 (2006). C riticism s of E R ISA ’s preem ption provisions are legion. See,
e.g., Fisk, supra note 46, at 35.
110. D odd-Frank W all Street R eform and C onsum er Protection A ct, Pub. L. N o. 111-203,
§ 1044(b)(1)(B ), 124 Stat. 1376, 2015 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U .S.C .).
111. M oreover, one of the m ost intriguing aspects of the Dodd-Frank A ct’s national bank
preem ption provisions is its dram atic increase in judicial preem ption discretion at the expense
of agency discretion. See infra Part III.
112. See C aleb N elson, Preem ption, 86 V A . L. R EV . 225, 234, 261 (2000) (proposing a
“logical-contradiction” test for preem ption, under w hich courts “ignore state law if (but only
if) state law contradicts a valid rule established by federal law , so that applying the state law
w ould entail disregarding the valid federal rule”); see also W yeth v. Levine, 129 S. C t. 1187,
1209 (2009) (Thom as, J., concurring) (advocating for the abandonm ent of the C ourt’s im plied
preem ption jurisprudence in favor of preem ption test sim ilar to that proposed by Professor
N elson). The Suprem e C ourt has yet to em brace the logical-contradiction test.
113. See, e.g., M errill, supra note 10, at 742 (“[C]ourts are actually m aking substantive
[policy] decisions in the nam e of preem ption.”); Sharpe, supra note 5, at 568 (“[T]here is a
puzzling and fundam ental disconnect betw een w hat the Suprem e C ourt says in its preem ption
cases, and w hat it does in its preem ption cases.”).
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attempting to enumerate the specific instances in which state law
is displaced by federal law, section 1044(b)(1)(B) gives courts wide
latitude to identify those instances themselves.
Ex post control mechanisms, by contrast, comprise the monitoring
methods available to Congress after it makes a delegation.114 In
theory, such mechanisms are numerous, and their use depends in
some measure on propriety and the most cost-effective means of
discovering and addressing delegation problems.115 Members of
Congress can, for example, resort to the relatively inexpensive
methods of sending letters or placing calls to delegates, threatening
to hold potentially embarrassing hearings or to cut funding, or
adopting resolutions staking out particular policy positions.116
Members can also hold hearings in which they publicly scrutinize
the decisions of agency officials. With substantially greater time and
effort, members can enact legislation to create private rights of
action and individual standing or to overturn an implementation
decision with which they disagree.117
When considerations of institutional choice are added, however,
delegating implementation to courts as opposed to administrative
agencies has immediate and significant consequences for the availability of these ex post control mechanisms. Courts are largely
insulated from congressional attempts at ex post influence or
control.118 As a matter of governmental culture, it is inappropriate
for members of Congress to send letters to judges expressing their
views on the potential outcomes of individual cases. While members
of Congress may file amicus briefs expressing such views, courts are
114. See E PSTEIN & O ’H ALLORAN , supra note 106, at 25.
115. The classic distinction here is betw een “police-patrol” and “fire-alarm ” m onitoring
system s. Each involves costly m onitoring of delegate activities, but they distribute the direct
costs of that m onitoring differently. W hereas police patrols require C ongress to incur
m onitoring costs by proactively scrutinizing delegate behavior itself, fire alarm s em pow er
private individuals and interest groups to exam ine delegate decisions. See M athew D .
M cC ubbins & Thom as Schw artz, C ongressional O versight O verlooked: Police Patrols Versus
Fire Alarm s, 28 A M . J. P OL. S CI. 165, 166 (1984).
116. See F ISHER , supra note 14, at 78.
117. C f. E PSTEIN & O ’H ALLORAN , supra note 106, at 24 (noting that interest groups are w ell
inform ed about relevant delegate actions).
118. M athew D . M cC ubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Adm inistrative Arrangem ents and the Political C ontrol of Agencies, 75 V A . L. R EV . 431, 445
(1989) (observing that m any of the procedural m echanism s used by C ongress to control agency
behavior are not available to control courts).
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under no obligation to read them, let alone follow them.119 Although
Congress could attempt to shape judicial opinions through the
appropriations process,120 doing so would be both unwise and ineffective. In all likelihood, the public would view a congressional
threat of cutting or increasing judicial funding to influence case
results as an unseemly infringement on the independence that
Article III affords the federal courts. Even if this were not the case,
an increase or a reduction in judicial appropriations is unlikely to
be sufficiently targeted to control the decisions of the 1776 judges
and magistrates currently authorized by the federal court system.121
Similar hurdles would impede congressional efforts to influence
state judges, with the additional impediment that Congress can only
conditionally promise to direct or threaten to withhold funds to state
court systems; such entreaties would first have to go to state
legislators who would then, in turn, have to lobby their courts on
Congress’s behalf.122
Administrative agencies, by contrast, are much more susceptible
to ex post congressional influence than are federal courts.123 Even in
the case of independent agencies or commissions, the cultural
proscriptions against congressional ex parte contacts with their
directors, commissioners, or board members are far less robust than
they are with federal judges.124 Congressional committees can target
119. A m anda L. Tyler, C ontinuity, C oherence, and the C anons, 99 N W . U . L. R EV. 1389,
1451 n.311 (2005).
120. Todd D . Peterson, Controlling the Federal C ourts Through the Appropriations Process,
1998 W IS. L. R EV. 993, 1033 (1998).
121. See J AMES C . D UFF, A DMIN . O FFICE OF THE U .S. C OURTS, J UDICIAL B USINESS OF THE
U NITED S TATES C OURTS: 2009 A NNUAL R EPORT OF THE D IRECTOR 34-37 (2009).
122. The possible exception here w ould be w ith popularly elected state judges, w here the
effects of the party system m ight be brought to bear. C f. Steven P. C roley, The M ajoritarian
D ifficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U . C HI. L. R EV . 689, 777 (1995)
(com m enting on effects w hen those charged w ith protecting the m inority are chosen by the
m ajority).
123. See F ISHER , supra note 14, at 71, 73, 75-78; J.R . D eShazo & Jody Freem an, Public
Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 C OLUM . L. R EV . 2217, 2235-36 (2005) (“Potential sanctions for an
agency’s failure to fulfill statutory m andates include political em barrassm ent at congressional
hearings, vulnerability to auditing and investigation, the threat of losing appropriations, and
even elim ination of the agency.”).
124. See M arshall J. B erger & G ary J. E dles, E stablished by Practice: The Theory and
O peration of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 A DMIN . L. R EV . 1111, 1194-95 (2000); cf. B ill
M ears, Scalia W on’t R ecuse H im self from C heney C ase, C N N .COM (M ar. 18, 2004),
http://articles.cnn.com /2004-03-18/justice/scalia.recusal_1_cheney-case-recuse-scalia-and-
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specific agency activities through the appropriations process,125 and
have some measure of control over the political appointments made
to those agencies by the President.126 Additionally, Congress can
empower courts to monitor agency actions to ensure compliance
with its goals.127 Agencies, on the other hand, are not in a position
to monitor the activities of the federal courts. The availability of
these ex post controls may be crucial to correcting the interpretation
and implementation mistakes that agencies are bound to make.128
Thus, even if Congress is unable to build the coalition needed to
alter the language of a legislative mandate, to overturn agency
decisions or actions, or to revise agency procedures,129 there are
numerous informal mechanisms to which it can resort.130
Given that courts are less susceptible to ex post congressional
influence than are administrative agencies, the Dodd-Frank Act
stands out as somewhat unusual. The Act clearly chooses the
judiciary to implement its pro-state, antipreemption policies. For
example, the Act instructs the courts to review OCC preemption
determinations with Skidmore as opposed to Chevron deference,131
which allows courts to shape preemption policy to a far greater
cheney?_s=PM :LA W .
125. D avid S. R ubenstein, “R elative C hecks”: Tow ards O ptim al C ontrol of Adm inistrative
Pow er, 51 W M . & M ARY L. R EV . 2169, 2207 (2010).
126. Jack M . B eerm ann, Congressional Adm inistration, 43 S AN D IEGO L. R EV . 61, 136
(2006).
127. M artin K ellner, C ongressional G rants of Standing in Adm inistrative Law and Judicial
R eview : Proposing a N ew Standing D octrine from a Delegation Perspective, 30 H AMLINE L .
R EV . 315, 337 (2007).
128. C f. F IORINA , supra note 70, at 48.
129. See D aniel B . R odriguez & B arry R. W eingast, The Positive Political Theory of
Legislative H istory: N ew Perspectives on the 1964 C ivil R ights Act and Its Interpretation, 151
U . P A . L. R EV. 1417, 1450-51 (2003).
130. This is not to say that m em bers of C ongress have free reign over agency conduct.
There are m eaningful legal checks on the level of influence they m ay exert on agency officials.
See F ISHER , supra note 14, at 80-82. N or is it the position of this A rticle that agencies are
perfectly “faithful agents,” in that they im m ediately or necessarily follow Congress’s postenactm ent influence. M oreover, agencies m ay not in all instances be m ore useful congressional delegates than courts, as there are circum stances in which congressional purposes
m ay be better served by the courts than by agencies. The point here is sim ply that, as a
general m atter, agencies are m ore easily influenced by C ongress than is the judiciary and, as
a consequence, C ongress m ay generally find delegating to agencies m ore desirable than
delegating to courts.
131. D odd-Frank W all Street Reform and C onsum er Protection A ct, Pub. L. N o. 111-203,
§ 1044(b)(5)(n), 124 Stat. 1376, 2015 (2010) (to be codified in 12 U .S.C. § 25b).
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extent than otherwise possible under the Court’s decision in
Cuomo.132 The Act also adopts the implied conflict and obstacle
preemption standards described by the Court in Barnett Bank v.
Nelson.133 As already described, these implied preemption tests
invite courts to engage in substantial policymaking,134 and are
considered by the courts to be implicit judicial delegations. Finally,
the Act burdens the OCC’s preemption decision-making procedures
without similarly burdening the procedures employed by the
courts.135
Taken together, these features invite the inference that Congress
regarded the judiciary, and the Supreme Court particularly, as the
implementing institution least likely to constrict state regulatory
authority in contravention of the legislative bargains memorialized
by the Act.136 Unlike the typical instance in which Congress is silent
on the delegation issue and the delegation devolves on the courts by
default,137 Congress specifically chose the courts over the OCC in the
Dodd-Frank Act. This may be the case for either of two reasons.
First, it may be that Congress can exert more effective postenactment control over the meaning and application of the Act if the
courts rather than the OCC are chiefly charged with its implementation. This explanation is somewhat implausible, however, considering that courts are not as susceptible to ex post congressional
controls as are administrative agencies.138
Second, and more plausibly, it may be that the potential for
postenactment judicial policy drifts is less concerning, and hence the
available methods of postenactment monitoring available to
Congress would be adequate to correct them. There are certainly
potential benefits to delegating preemption authority to courts as
opposed to agencies. Perhaps chief among them is the potential to
132. See Cuom o v. C learing H ouse A ss’n, 129 S. C t. 2710, 2715 (2009).
133. 517 U .S. 25, 31 (1996).
134. See supra Part I.C .
135. § 1044(c), 124 Stat. at 2016.
136. See infra Part III. C ongress also m ade the O C C an independent agency. See § 315, 124
Stat. at 1524, w hich indicates C ongress’s intent to increase its influence over the agency w hile
lim iting the influence of the President. This change indicates som e aw areness on C ongress’s
part of the need to retain som e m easure of control over the policy decisions m ade by its
delegates. See id.
137. See supra Part I.C .1.
138. See supra note 118 and accom panying text.

2011]

LEGISLATING PREEMPTION

195

protect Congress’s preemption policy choices from the contrary
views of future Presidents, particularly if the Presidency is controlled by an opposing political party. Whereas a President can have
substantial influence over how an administrative agency resolves
preemption issues,139 a President is unlikely to have similar influence over how courts resolve those issues. Committing these
decisions to courts can therefore have a greater potential to lock in
desired results by insulating them from the Executive’s competing
policy preferences. The lingering concern would then be judicial
policy drift. One would expect Congress to protect its preemption
policy choices from the President by delegating authority to courts
where Congress is confident that it can rein in judicial policy drift,
or where such policy drift is unlikely to occur.
Given that the members of Congress and their staffers who were
responsible for the Dodd-Frank Act’s national bank preemption
provisions could not have reasonably expected to exercise more
robust ex post legislative controls over the courts than over the
OCC, it would follow that they instead assumed, or would have
assumed had they specifically considered the matter, that the Court
would by and large interpret and apply the Act’s preemption
provisions in a manner that tended to favor more state regulation.
At a minimum, they could have assumed that the Court would do so
more frequently than would the OCC. Either of these assumptions
could be based on an expectation that the Court will recognize and
respect the overall pro-state leanings of the Act’s national banking
preemption provisions, or on the expectation that the Court will
construe the Act’s terms by relying on its legislative history, over
which members of Congress have substantial control.140

139. U nless, of course, the agency is independent and thus m ore insulated from the
President’s influence. See R achel E . Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding C apture Through
Institutional Design, 89 T EX . L . R EV . 15, 25-26 (2010) (describing how agency independence
shifts control from the President to C ongress); see also Sharkey, supra note 43 (noting that
the D odd-Frank A ct m akes the O C C an independent agency, and hence insulates it from
E xecutive O rder 13,132, w hich im poses specific federalism procedures on agencies).
140. See supra text accom panying notes 20-21.

196

W ILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:163

II. P REEMPTION AND L EGISLATIVE C ONTROL OVER J UDICIAL
I NTERPRETATION
As already described, Congress has numerous monitoring
strategies and procedural devices at its disposal to ensure that its
chosen policy delegates conform to legislatively created mandates.141
Because the range of ex post control options available to Congress
is quite limited when its chosen delegate is the judiciary, by far the
most important of these options is the language of its statutory
enactments.142 However, courts will inevitably stray from the
intended effects of even the most carefully crafted statutes.143 As a
consequence, Congress must either attempt to influence the
methods by which courts will interpret its legislation in future
cases, or it must be confident that the courts will settle on interpretations that adhere to its conception of statutory purpose. Both
options require some understanding of the judiciary’s preemption
policy presumptions. This Part first describes the monitoring
mechanisms available to Congress when its chosen delegate is the
judiciary and discusses how those methods can be used most
effectively given different preemption policy goals. It then uses two
areas of the Court’s “new federalism” jurisprudence—implied
statutory remedies and the clear statement rule—to illustrate the
effect that judicial default rules have on federal legislation in
contexts closely related to preemption. This Part then identifies the
preemption default adopted by the Court, contrasts it with the
Court’s “new federalism” jurisprudence, and discusses its implications for Congress’s preemption policy goals.
A. Influence over Judicial Interpretation
At the outset, it is important to recognize that many of Congress’s
monitoring difficulties could theoretically be reduced simply by
141. See M cN ollgast, Positive and N orm ative M odels of Procedural R ights: An Integrative
Approach to Adm inistrative Procedures, 6 J.L. E CON . & O RG . 307, 312-13 (1990).
142. See M aureen B . C avanaugh, O rder in M ultiplicity: Aristotle on Text, C ontext, and the
R ule of Law , 79 N .C. L. R EV. 577, 600 n.72 (2001).
143. See M ichael P. H ealy, C om m unis Opinio and the M ethods of Statutory Interpretation:
Interpreting Law or C hanging Law , 43 W M . & M ARY L. R EV . 539, 561 & n.91 (2001).
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enacting clear statutory mandates regarding its intent to preempt
state law. Though it is an open question as to what the Supremacy
Clause requires, Congress could, for example, dictate the legal
consequence of a court’s finding of irreconcilable conflict between
state and federal law by specifically directing the court to choose
state law,144 or by explicitly stating its intent to occupy an entire
field of regulation. The Dodd-Frank Act, in one notable instance,
does exactly that.145 Alternatively, Congress could create a federal
statutory remedy in those instances where the Court’s preemption
decisions eliminate state remedial opportunities.146
As already explained, there are numerous reasons why Congress
rarely does so.147 Even where Congress has managed to draft a clear
preemption or saving clause, there is a temporal aspect to statutory
interpretation that can raise a barrier to the courts acting as
faithful agents: deciding to which Congress courts owe their
allegiance. Courts must choose whether to follow the directives of
the Congress that enacted the potentially preemptive statutory
language or the directives of the sitting Congress that has the power
to overrule its interpretation.148 It is safe to assume that the
preferences of these two bodies will not align, given that the
differences in their personnel reflect intervening changes in voter
144. The test case w ould be one involving so-called “im possibility” preem ption, w here
federal and state requirem ents conflict to such a degree that sim ultaneous com pliance w ith
both is im possible. If the Suprem acy Clause operates as a constraint on C ongress’s legislative
pow er, then C ongress could not “opt out” of having its law s trum p those of the states. If, on
the other hand, the Suprem acy C lause operates as a default rule that privileges federal law ,
then C ongress could expressly perm it com pliance w ith state law when it conflicts w ith federal
law. C f. R ichard H . Fallon, Jr., The “C onservative” Paths of the R ehnquist C ourt’s Federalism
D ecisions, 69 U . C HI. L. R EV . 429, 462 (2002) (“In cases of actual conflict betw een state and
federal com m ands, federal law indisputably prevails under the Suprem acy Clause of A rticle
V I. The recurring question is w hether C ongress, although possessed of pow er to displace state
rules, has m anifested its intent to do so.”).
145. See Pub. L. N o. 111-203, § 1004(b)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 2015 (2010) (stating that the
A ct’s preem ption standards relating to state consum er financial protection law s “[do] not
occupy the field in any area of State law”).
146. A proposed but ultim ately rejected provision in the H ouse version of the D odd-Frank
A ct w ould have had a sim ilar effect. See W all Street R eform and Consum er Protection A ct of
2009, H .R . 4173, 111th C ong. § 4404(d) (2009) (requiring the O CC or a court to find that a
substantive federal consum er protection standard is in place before preem pting a state law ).
147. See supra Part I.B .
148. See John Ferejohn, Law , Legislation, and P ositive Political Theory, in M ODERN
P OLITICAL E CONOMY 191, 204 (Jeffrey S. B anks & E ric A . H anushek eds., 1995).
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preferences.149 Courts that view their role as protecting the legislative bargain reached by the enacting Congress will likely be mindful
of how the sitting Congress will respond to their decisions—so as to
further minimize the possibility of legislative override 150 —but will
ultimately decide cases that do not give full effect to the preferences
of the sitting Congress.151 This type of “strategic jurisprudence”
further complicates Congress’s attempts to control judicial interpretation of its enactments.152 Courts may therefore be either unwilling
or unable to follow Congress’s instructions due to factors wholly
exogenous to the clarity of the baseline statutory text.
Whether one accepts or rejects the premise that judges do not
always strive to fully enforce Congress’s policy choices, it follows
that Congress would not just want to control the statutory language
that gives formal expression to its policy choices, but it would also
want to control, or at least to heavily influence, the methods of
statutory interpretation employed by the judiciary when applying
statutory language to the facts of specific cases.153 In this regard,
and contrary to what others who study preemption have suggested,154 statutory language need not be used solely as an ex ante
control mechanism. It can also be used as an indirect ex post control
mechanism.
By altering the form of its preemption provisions, Congress can
influence the availability of the interpretive methods employed by
the courts, which are primarily textualism and purposivism.155 The
available method of interpretation, in turn, affects the amount of ex
post control Congress exercises over judicial interpretation of its
statutes. For example, choosing to adopt a clear preemption rule, as
opposed to a preemption standard, makes it easier for courts to
149. See id.
150. See supra Part I.A .
151. Ferejohn, supra note 148, at 204.
152. See id.
153. See Linda D . Jellum , “W hich Is To B e M aster,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? W hen
Statutory D irectives Violate Separation of Pow ers, 56 U C LA L. R EV . 837, 892-93 (2009).
154. See, e.g., M errill, supra note 10, at 754 (asserting that C ongress is not w ell suited to
m anage preem ption issues because, in part, “[l]egislation operates ex ante, before particular
disputes about im plem entation and enforcem ent em erge”).
155. O f course, there are alternative interpretation m ethods that have been proposed by
scholars. I nevertheless lim it m y discussion here to textualism and purposivism because those
are the m ethods of interpretation prim arily used in the federal courts.
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employ textualist methods of statutory interpretation. A clear rule
in this context would provide an all but unmistakable indication of
Congress’s preemptive intent.156 Courts would be left to determine
the text’s “plain meaning” without having to resort to the primary
extratextual source of Congress’s intent: legislative history.157 By
foregoing reliance on legislative history, over which Congress exercises complete control, courts are able to lessen Congress’s opportunities to influence policymaking after enacting statutes.158 Stated
differently, facilitating judicial adoption of textualism “limits the
options of legislators who would seek political advantage through
opportunistic use of legislative history.”159 This reduction in congressional influence produces a concomitant increase in judicial
interpretive independence.160
Clear statutory language may clearly resolve some preemption
issues. As already explained, however, Congress cannot draft preemptive legislation so detailed as to anticipate all of the statefederal conflicts that courts and agencies will invariably face.161 The

156. C ourts have deem ed a handful of express preem ption clauses as self-executing in this
respect. See, e.g., M otor V ehicle M frs. A ss’n v. N .Y. D ep’t of E nvtl. C onservation, 17 F.3d 521,
533 (2d C ir. 1994) (discussing self-executing provision of C lean Air A ct).
157. Joel E . Tasca, C om m ent, Judicial Interpretation of the E ffect of the Supplem ental
Jurisdiction Statute on the C om plete Am ount in C ontroversy Rule: A C ase for Plain M eaning
Statutory C onstruction, 46 E MORY L.J. 435, 462 (1997). This is not to say that textualists do
not rely on extra-textual sources of m eaning w hen interpreting statutory language. For
instance, they routinely rely on dictionaries to assist them in construing a text’s m eaning. See
Phillip A . R ubin, N ote, W ar of the W ords: H ow C ourts C an U se D ictionaries in Accordance
w ith Textualist Principles, 60 D UKE L.J. 167, 175 (2010) (“[D ]ictionaries are external sources
of interpretation.”).
158. See N icholas S. Zeppos, Legislative H istory and the Interpretation of Statutes: Tow ard
a Fact-Finding M odel of Statutory Interpretation, 76 V A . L. R EV . 1295, 1331-32 (1990).
159. R odriguez, supra note 64, at 223 (explaining how lim iting judicial use of legislative
history “disem pow ers legislators by debilitating one of the m ore useful w ays of influencing
future interpretation”).
160. Zeppos, supra note 158, at 1332 (“Congress has historically exercised its pow er and
influence in w ays other than the passage of legislation under A rticle I. B y dem anding that
C ongress now spell out its prerogatives in the text itself, textualism inevitably lessens the
pow er of the legislative branch.”).
161. See supra notes 61-64 and accom panying text. A prom inent exam ple is the express
preem ption clause in the M D A. D espite specifically preem pting any m edical device standards
different from those prom ulgated by the FD A , courts have failed to agree on its proper scope
of application. See Sharpe, supra note 5, at 397-99 (describing the Suprem e C ourt’s difficulties
in determ ining w hether the M D A preem ption clause preem pts state law tort design defect
claim s).
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core problem with legislative drafting in general is that some gapfilling by Congress’s chosen delegate—whether court or agency—is
inevitable.162 Preemption is no different in this respect,163 though
what informs that gap-filling is specific to the preemption context.164
This is why, at least in part, Congress frequently chooses to adopt
preemption standards as opposed to clear preemption rules or, even
more frequently, why Congress is simply silent as to its specific
preemptive intent.165 This is also why the Court has developed the
implied preemption doctrines to fill in gaps—or, as the case may be,
to establish federal common law. Because incomplete, vague, or
ambiguous statutory prescriptions necessarily leave policy details
to the implementation stage,166 courts are hard pressed to find
sufficient textual guidance regarding their intended effects. Courts
must then turn to extratextual sources of information to fill in the
gaps,167 and one of those sources will likely be the legislative history
that is controlled by Congress.168 That legislative history—in the
162. See Peter L. Strauss, O n R esegregating the W orlds of Statute and C om m on Law , 1994
S UP. C T. R EV . 429, 442 (1994).
163. See Sharpe, supra note 5, at 401-02.
164. See discussion supra notes 42-45 and accom panying text.
165. See Sharpe, supra note 5, at 395-96 (discussing judicial assessm ent of preem ption and
savings clauses that are vague and lack clarity); cf. B arnett B ank v. N elson, 517 U .S. 25, 31
(1996) (“Som etim es courts, w hen facing the pre-em ption question, find language in the federal
statute that reveals an explicit congressional intent to pre-em pt state law . M ore often, explicit
pre-em ption language does not appear, or does not directly answ er the question.” (citation
om itted)).
166. S ee John F. M anning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional
Interpretation, 122 H ARV . L. R EV . 2003, 2018 & n.69 (2009) (noting that indeterm inate
legislative language som etim es “reflect[s] an im plicit or explicit legislative choice to delegate
to interpreters authority over policy details”).
167. C f. Zeppos, supra note 158, at 1330 (“B roadly phrased statutes like section 1988 or the
Sherm an A ct in effect operate as delegations of authority to the courts to develop a federal
com m on law on the subject, be it attorneys’ fees or antitrust. W ith such com m on law statutes,
it seem s inevitable that guidance m ust be sought from nontextual sources.”).
168. See R odriguez, supra note 64, at 222. Furtherm ore, several em pirical studies of
judicial statutory interpretation found significant reliance on legislative history. See Frank
B . C ross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretive M ethodologies, 82 N OTRE D AME L. R EV .
1971, 1983 (2007) (reporting that “legislative intent rem ains a significant source for statutory
interpretation,” and that “the purported ‘death’ of legislative history is exaggerated”); Jane
S. Schacter, The C onfounding C om m on Law O riginalism in R ecent Suprem e C ourt Statutory
Interpretation: Im plications for the Legislative H istory Debate and B eyond, 51 S TAN . L. R EV .
1, 15 (1998) (determ ining that legislative history w as cited in 49 percent of the m ajority
opinions during the Suprem e C ourt’s 1996 Term ); N icholas S. Zeppos, T he U se of Authority
in Statutory Interpretation: An E m pirical Analysis, 70 T EX . L. R EV . 1073, 1088, 1093 (1992)
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form of conference reports, committee reports, hearings, and floor
statements—is often designed by legislators to influence judicial
interpretation.169 By encouraging courts to rely on legislative
history, Congress shifts the balance of interpretive power, and hence
policy control, toward itself and away from the courts.170
For at least two reasons, this “interpretive nudging” approach to
ex post congressional influence over judicial interpretation may not,
on its own, serve Congress equally well in all circumstances. First,
courts are not certain to rely on legislative history when construing
indeterminate statutory text.171 Were courts encouraged or even
forced to consider extratextual evidence of Congress’s preemptive
intent, it is likely that they would resort to legislative history.172
There are no guarantees, however. Despite Congress’s best efforts
to constrain courts’ options of extratextual interpretive materials,
courts are still free to ignore legislative history. The Cuomo decision

(determ ining that, in a random sam ple of 413 Suprem e Court cases decided betw een 1890 and
1990, 32 percent cited congressional reports, 16.9 percent cited floor debates, and 12.6 percent
cited hearing m aterials). E ven Justice Scalia, the staunchest textualist on the C ourt, has
joined opinions that relied in part on legislative history. See C ross, supra at 1987 (reporting
that Justice Scalia joined three opinions betw een 1994 and 2002 that relied on legislative
history, though he authored none him self).
169. Patricia M . W ald, The Sizzling Sleeper: T he U se of Legislative H istory in C onstruing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the U nited States Suprem e C ourt, 39 A M . U . L. R EV . 277, 306
(1990) (asserting the benefits and im portance of judicial use of legislative history); see also
Zeppos, supra note 158, at 1331 (“Through judicial resort to legislative history, C ongress and
its m em bers have been able to exert continuing influence over policym aking decisions that
arise after the enactm ent of the statute.”).
170. See R odriguez, supra note 64, at 221-23. C ongress could also attem pt to pass
legislation requiring courts to rely on legislative history or forbidding them to use certain
interpretive m ethods. Such attem pts, though tried by C ongress in the past, have routinely
failed. See id. at 224-25 (describing attem pt to include a rule of construction provision in the
C ivil R ights A ct of 1991). In any event, it is unclear w hether C ongress is constitutionally
em pow ered to enact such statutes. C om pare G ary Law son, C ontrolling Precedent:
C ongressional R egulation of Judicial Decision-M aking, 18 C ONST. C OMMENT. 191, 211 (2001)
(arguing that Congress lacks the pow er to control how the judiciary interprets its statutes),
and Larry A lexander & Saikrishna Prakash, M other M ay I? Im posing M andatory Prospective
R ules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 C ONST. C OMMENT. 97, 98-99 (2003), w ith N icholas Q uinn
R osenkranz, Federal R ules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 H ARV . L. R EV . 2085, 2088 (2002)
(arguing that C ongress has the authority to codify som e m ethods of statutory interpretation).
171. See Rodriguez, supra note 64, at 223.
172. See Cross, supra note 168, at 1988 (noting that even though m ost believe textualism
and the use of legislative history are at odds, Justices som etim es use both w hen trying to
m ake their argum ents).
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provides an example.173 The issue there was whether the OCC
properly determined the scope of its “visitorial powers” under the
NBA. According to the OCC, “visitorial powers” included its exclusive authority both to inspect and to bring law enforcement actions
against national banks.174 As a consequence of this interpretation,
the OCC claimed that the New York State Attorney General was
preempted from initiating inspection or law enforcement actions
against national banks located in the state.175 Although the Court
concluded that the term “visitorial powers” was ambiguous,176 it
made no mention of the NBA’s legislative history in concluding that
the OCC’s interpretation was unreasonably broad under Chevron.177
Justice Thomas, writing separately, also concluded that the term
“visitorial powers” was ambiguous.178 Though he rejected the Court’s
conclusion that the OCC’s interpretation was unreasonably broad,
he too declined to rely on any legislative history to support his
arguments.179 When the Court ignores legislative history, Congress
is left with legislative override as its only ex post monitoring mechanism.
Second, Congress cannot be sure that the courts will rely on
legislative history in the way that Congress intended or of which
Congress approves, even if courts do turn to it.180 In other words,
there is no necessarily causal relationship between the methods of
interpretation employed by the courts and the preemption results
they reach in particular cases. This point can be illustrated with a
simplified example, made under the following three limiting as173. C uom o v. C learing H ouse A ss’n, 129 S. C t. 2710 (2009).
174. Id. at 2715.
175. Id. at 2714.
176. Id. at 2715.
177. N otably, this decision not to rely on legislative history does not appear to be a
byproduct of ideological differences. W hile Justice Scalia, a staunch textualist, w rote the
m ajority opinion, it w as joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, G insburg, and Breyer, all of w hom
are inclined to rely on legislative history w hen faced w ith indeterm inate legislation. See A nita
S. K rishnakum ar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts C ourt’s First Era: An E m pirical and
D octrinal Analysis, 62 H ASTINGS L.J. 221, 251-52 (2010) (“Justices Souter, G insburg, B reyer,
and Stevens exhibited the highest rates of reliance on interpretive tools that prom ote statutespecific coherence— that is, legislative history, purpose, intent, and practical consequences
focused on policy constancy concerns.”).
178. 129 S. Ct. at 2722 (Thom as J., concurring).
179. Id. at 2722-23.
180. See Rodriguez, supra note 64, at 223.
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sumptions. First, there are two factors that dominate the outcomes
in preemption cases: methods of statutory interpretation and
background assumptions regarding the federal-state balance.
Second, each of these factors has two forms. With respect to the
methods of statutory interpretation, the first restricts the evidence
of congressional intent to the plain language of the statute,
textualism, while the second allows consideration of the statute’s
legislative history, purposivism. With respect to assumptions
regarding preemption, the first favors federal regulatory control,
while the second favors state regulatory control. Third, there are
two institutions that compete for control over these factors:
Congress and the Court. One institution’s expansion of power over
a particular factor necessarily results in a contraction of the other
institution’s power over that factor.
Given these assumptions, Table 1 below provides a simplified
representation of the legislative choices available to Congress when
attempting to guide judicial preemption policy implementation. The
methods of statutory interpretation employed by the Court could
have one of two effects on the balance of interpretive power between
Congress and the courts: they could be Congress-aggrandizing (CA)
or they could be Judiciary-aggrandizing (JA). Table 1 also assumes
that preemption cases will have one of two possible results: state
regulatory power could be aggrandized (SA), or federal regulatory
power could be aggrandized (FA).
Table 1
Outcome #1

CA/SA

Outcome #2

CA/FA

Outcome #3

JA/SA

Outcome #4

JA/FA

Based on these assumptions, Table 1 indicates the potential
difficulties of cabining the courts’ interpretive and preemption
choices. Assuming that Congress could successfully manipulate the
courts into adopting CA methods of interpretation, there are still
two preemption results that could result from it. Without some
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additional connecting factor, the courts could still choose either SA
or FA. Conversely, if Congress were to cede control of statutory
meaning to the courts (JA), there is still no guarantee that the
courts will then choose SA over FA, or vice versa. In sum, any
legislative effort to influence the outcome of preemption cases
through statutory interpretation requires some additional understanding of how the available interpretive options relate to how the
judiciary balances federal and state regulatory power. Table 1
therefore indicates that generalized increases or decreases of
interpretive control will not necessarily serve Congress’s preemption
policy goals. Rather, its choice of CA or JA must be responsive to the
judiciary’s predispositions toward SA and FA.
This insight affects the basic strategic options Congress should
consider ex ante when its members bargain for the final wording of
preemptive legislation. For example, it affects whether that legislation is crafted in the form of a rule or a standard, and the specific
subjects to which the rule or standard is addressed. It also affects
how Congress should prioritize its interests. That prioritization is
reflected by the numerical values in Table 2, which assumes for
illustrative purposes that Congress would prefer to increase its own
interpretive power, but that its primary goal is to increase the
regulatory power of the states—or, put another way, to reduce the
frequency of federal preemption.
Table 2.
SA

FA

JA

2

4

CA

1

3

From Congress’s perspective, the best result is the CA/SA pairing,
gained directly through clear legislative text or indirectly through
a combination of text and interpretive nudging. The second-best
result would be the direct selection of the JA/SA pairing. Assuming
that preemption reduction is prioritized over ex post statutory
control, Congress should be willing to cede control of statutory
meaning to the judiciary if doing so would still result in preemption
reduction. By contrast, Congress should avoid the CA/FA pairing.
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While it would preserve Congress’s power of ex post statutory
control, it would fail to accomplish its primary preemption-reduction
goal. Finally, the JA/FA pairing represents complete legislative
failure; not only would Congress fail to achieve its preemptionreduction goal, it would also cede interpretive control to the courts.
If the courts are predisposed to FA, then the costs associated with
adopting a SA legislative scheme will increase. To overcome the
judiciary’s FA predisposition, members of Congress would have to
settle on specific statutory text, create favorable legislative history
and hope that the courts will rely on it, or adopt some combination
of both approaches. In other words, members of Congress who wish
to reduce preemption would need to create sufficiently persuasive
evidence to convince courts that Congress did not intend to preempt
state law. They would therefore be led to adopt CA as opposed to JA
to reach their ultimate preemption policy goal. Without knowledge
of the judiciary’s FA predisposition, those members could unwittingly adopt a JA approach that would thwart their antipreemption
policy goals. Additionally, those members would have to reconsider
whether their initial antipreemption policy goal is worth the effort
if one assumes that adopting CA is more difficult than adopting JA,
which would simply involve the adoption of vague, ambiguous, or
incomplete statutory text.181
Whether Congress chooses to delegate preemption implementation primarily to courts or to agencies, it can use the specificity of
legislative text as an ex ante control mechanism. If Congress
chooses to delegate preemption policy implementation to the courts
and not to administrative agencies, interpretive nudging is the
primary ex post control mechanism it has apart from legislative
override. The right combination of textual specificity and interpretive nudging to reach congressional policy goals depends on the
courts’ predisposition toward preemption. If Congress ignores this
fact, it may achieve the preemption policy outcomes it wants in
some cases, but is likely to fail in many others.
181. The difficulties associated w ith adopting C A are not lim ited to the technical challenges
of drafting sufficiently specific language or sufficiently clear and persuasive legislative
history. G reater textual specificity also affords few er opportunities to use am biguity to gloss
over disagreem ents am ongst disagreeing coalitions, to deflect interest group pressures, or to
shift the political costs of decision m aking to other branches of governm ent. See R odriguez,
supra note 64, at 218.
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B. Implied Remedies and Clear Statement Default Rules
The ultimate effectiveness of either the ex ante drafting or ex post
interpretive nudging depends in large part on the background
preemption presumptions against which the courts construe
legislative text. Courts will often fall back on their assumptions
about federalism, regulatory efficiency, or corrective justice when
faced with a federal statute that does not directly address a salient
policy question. The Court’s recent jurisprudence in two areas of
federal statutory interpretation—implied statutory remedies and
clear statement requirements—are particularly instructive in this
regard. In both areas the Court has shifted its presumed balance of
federal-state regulatory power and increased the difficulty that
Congress would have in overcoming that presumption.
1. Implied Statutory Remedies
Until relatively recently, the Supreme Court relied on traditional
purposivist methods of interpretation to determine whether
Congress intended courts to imply private causes of action in the
absence of express language doing so.182 This interpretive methodology led the Court to rely heavily on extratextual evidence to
reconstruct Congress’s intent, which frequently resulted in the
creation of a federal right to file suit. The Court’s decision in J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak is a notable example,183 one that was decided
during the Warren Court’s general expansion of federal rights and
judicial jurisdiction.184 The case involved a determination of whether
Congress intended the antifraud provision in section 14 of the
Securities Exchange Act to be enforced through private causes of
action. Under the language of the Act, enforcement rested solely

182. See infra Part II.B .1.
183. 377 U .S. 426 (1964).
184. See E rw in C hem erinsky, E nding the Parity Debate, 71 B.U . L. R EV . 593, 597 (1991)
(“The W arren C ourt generally expanded the scope of constitutional rights.”); R ebecca E .
Zietlow , The Judicial R estraint of the W arren C ourt (and W hy It M atters), 69 O HIO S T. L.J.
255, 257 (2008) (“The m any ‘activist’ rulings of the W arren C ourt expanding individual rights
and the jurisdiction of federal courts are the paradigm atic exam ples of courts protecting the
rights of m inorities.”).
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with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).185 A unanimous Court nevertheless concluded that “[p]rivate enforcement of
the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission
action.”186 The Court based this conclusion not only on its reading of
the language of the Act,187 but also on several extratextual evidentiary sources it believed would illuminate the Act’s purpose: House
and Senate committee reports describing the goals of the Act and
the underlying problems it was intended to address;188 the Court’s
independent views regarding the optimal enforcement regime for
effectively enforcing the Act;189 and the presumption that “it is the
duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are
necessary to make effective the congressional purpose.” 190
The federalism default rule underlying the Court’s decision
unmistakably leaned toward federal as opposed to state regulatory
authority. The effect of the Court’s decision was to expand federal
jurisdiction into an area already addressed by state tort law. The
Court made this clear by specifically rejecting the argument that the
relief afforded by any implied federal cause of action under the Act
should be limited to prospective relief because the states already
provided adequate remedies at law.191 The Court underscored the
point when it observed that, without a federal cause of action,
“victims of deceptive proxy statements would be obliged to go into
state courts for remedial relief,” 192 and that states may not adequately address the harms Congress intended the Act to cure.193
Although the Borak Court did not look to displace state tort law, it
did presume that Congress wanted potential shareholder plaintiffs
to have a federal alternative to the judicial procedures and remedial
schemes already provided by the several states. As the extratextual
intent evidence on which the Court relied did nothing to disturb this

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

B orak, 377 U .S. at 427 n.1.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 431-32.
Id. at 431 (citing H .R . R EP. N O . 73-1383, at 13 (1934); S. R EP. N O . 73-792, at 12 (1934)).
Id. at 432-33.
Id. at 433.
Id. at 434-35.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 434-35.
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presumption—to the contrary, it supported it—the presumption
drove the outcome.
The Court’s implied remedy opinions migrated slowly away from
Borak’s heavy reliance on legislative history and federal judicial
responsibility, and toward a singular focus on legislative text and
the presumption that states are well equipped to remedy private
wrongs. In Cort v. Ash, the Court recast the implied remedies issue
in a way that challenged Borak’s presumption that the federal
judiciary plays a special role in the vindication of federal rights.194
While the implied remedies test formulated by the Ash Court still
allowed courts to rely heavily on legislative history,195 legislative
history would have to be used to overcome the very different
presumption that state remedies were adequate.196
The full extent of the Court’s migration away from reliance on
legislative history and federalization was portended by Justice
Rehnquist’s influential concurrence in Cannon v. University of
Chicago, which addressed whether the Court should imply a private
right of action for sex discrimination under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972.197 Criticizing the purpose-driven approach to
interpretation used in Borak and Ash, Justice Rehnquist advised
his colleagues to leave remedy creation to Congress.198 Justice
Rehnquist’s entreaty to his colleagues is important in two respects.
First, it assumes that state remedies are adequate to address
private injuries, and thus rejects Borak. Second, it limits the intent
evidence the Court should consider to legislative text,199 and thus
significantly narrows the opportunities that members of Congress
have to influence post-enactment judicial interpretation. In sum,
194. 422 U .S. 66 (1975). The Ash C ourt observed that it w ould be guided by the following
three inquiries w hen deciding w hether to im ply a private cause of action from a federal
statute that did not expressly provide one: (1) w hether the plaintiff w as part of the class of
persons w hom C ongress intended to benefit from the statute; (2) w hether there were any
im plicit or explicit indications that C ongress intended to provide or to deny a private rem edy;
and (3) w hether it w ould be inappropriate to create a private rem edy because the activity in
question w as one of state concern and arose in an area of regulation that traditionally was
controlled by the states. Id. at 78.
195. The C ourt in Ash itself, as it did in B orak, relied not only on the text of the statute
being construed, but also on its legislative history to infer its purposes. See id. at 81-82.
196. Id. at 78.
197. 441 U .S. 677, 677 (1979).
198. Id. at 717-18 (R ehnquist, J., concurring).
199. Id.
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Justice Rehnquist felt that states should be presumed to provide
adequate remedies absent highly specific—that is, textual—evidence of Congress’s intent to do otherwise.
The migration suggested by Justice Rehnquist in Cannon was
essentially completed in Alexander v. Sandoval.200 Section 602 of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizes federal agencies
to enforce the Act’s antidiscrimination provisions 201 “by issuing
rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability.”202 Pursuant to
this section, the DOJ promulgated a rule forbidding states that
received federal grants from “utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to
discrimination because of ... race, color, or national origin.” 203 The
plaintiffs asked the Court to infer a private right of action to enforce
this regulation against the State of Alabama’s Department of Public
Safety, asserting that the Department’s English-only driver’s license
exam policy had a discriminatorily disparate impact on non-English
speakers because of their national origins.204
Finding that it could both begin and end “[its] search for
Congress’s intent with the text and structure of Title VI,”205 the fiveJustice majority rejected the plaintiffs’ request to infer a disparate
impact cause of action from section 602.206 W riting for the Court,
Justice Scalia relied on the common law canon of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius in concluding that Congress had no intention of
allowing private rights of action under section 602.207 He first noted
that Congress set out elaborate procedures to enforce regulations
200. 532 U .S. 275 (2001).
201. Id. at 278. These provisions are covered in section 601, which states that “no person
shall, ‘on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrim ination under any program or activity’
covered by Title VI.” Id. at 278 (quoting 42 U .S.C . § 2000d (2006)).
202. Id. (quoting 42 U .S.C . § 2000d-1 (2006)).
203. Id. (quoting 28 C .F.R . § 42.104(b)(2) (2000)).
204. Id. at 278-79. A lthough the C ourt concluded that section 601 already provided a
private cause of action, those actions w ere lim ited to claim s of intentional discrim ination.
A ccording to the Court, the only strategy available to the plaintiffs w as to bring their
disparate im pact claim under the broader language of section 602, because that section allows
federal agencies to prom ulgate rules prohibiting both intentional and disparate im pact
discrim ination. Id. at 280-81.
205. Id. at 288.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 289 (noting that section 602 focuses on the regulating agencies, not individuals).
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promulgated under that section.208 He then emphasized that the
section barred agencies from initiating enforcement actions without
first notifying the target state that it was in violation of the section,
or without concluding that the state’s compliance with the section
could not be secured by voluntary means.209 Moreover, a federal
agency that attempted to pull funding had to provide both the
House and Senate with reports explaining the reasons for such
action, and the agency’s decision only became effective thirty days
after the report was filed.210 All of this, Justice Scalia concluded,
“tend[ed] to contradict a congressional intent to create privately
enforceable rights through § 602.” 211
On their own, neither these provisions nor their characterization
by Justice Scalia as “elaborate”212 necessarily show that Congress
intended to forbid implied private rights of action. As Justice
Stevens pointed out in his dissent, resort to the “nature of the rights
at issue,” “the relevant legislative history,” and “the text and
structure of the statute” would have led to the conclusion that the
plaintiffs were entitled to an implied remedy.213 Put another way,
Justice Stevens argued that it was not self-evident what legal
conclusions should be drawn from the fact that section 602’s
enforcement provisions are intricate. Some principle or rule must
invest them with legal significance.
Whereas Justice Stevens would have bridged this gap between
the enforcement provisions and conclusions regarding Congress’s
intent with a presumption in favor of creating federal remedies,
Justice Scalia bridged it with a presumption against doing so. The
federalism assumptions underlying the Court’s use of the expressio
unius canon appeared to reject the federally skewed balance that it
assumed in its prior implied remedies cases. In Borak, the Court
was adamant that its identification of a federal right presumed the
necessity of its creation of a federal judicial remedy.214 Moreover, the
208. See id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 290.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 312 & n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting C annon v. U niv. of C hi., 441 U .S.
667, 691, 694, 696-98, 703 (1979)).
214. J.I. C ase C o. v. Borak, 377 U .S. 426, 433 (1964) (“It is for the federal courts to adjust
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Borak Court pressed the need for a federal damages remedy despite
the acknowledged preponderance of state corporation law issues.215
In Sandoval, by contrast, the Court implicitly rejected the proposition that federal courts are presumed to be available to individuals
whose federally created rights have been violated. Rather, the
availability of such remedies is controlled by the laws enacted by
Congress;216 the federal courts have no extra-statutory responsibility
that presses them to extend federal judicial jurisdiction to the limits
of federal legislative jurisdiction. The Court’s observation that
“‘affirmative’ evidence of congressional intent must be provided for
an implied remedy, not against it,”217 leaves the default federalism
rule oriented toward state power.
M oreover, Justice Scalia drastically narrowed the body of evidence that could be mustered to overcome his presumption by
relying on the textualist assumptions embedded in the expressio
unius canon. “The express provision of one method of enforcing a
substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude
others.”218 Justice Scalia effectively replaced purposivist evidence of
legislative behavior—primarily legislative history controlled by
Congress—with a textualist presumption about congressional legislative behavior, the content of which was controlled by the Court.
2. The Clear Statement Rule
This confluence of textualism and federalism seen in the Court’s
implied statutory remedies cases found its clearest expression in
Gregory v. Ashcroft.219 In surprisingly categorical terms, the Gregory
Court decreed that “if Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,
it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.”220 Like Sandoval, Gregory indicated that the
their rem edies so as to grant the necessary relief w here federally secured rights are invaded.”
(internal quotation m arks om itted)).
215. Id. at 434-35.
216. See supra notes 200-13.
217. Sandoval, 532 U .S. at 293 n.8.
218. Id. at 290.
219. 501 U .S. 452 (1991).
220. Id. at 460 (quoting A tascadero State H osp. v. Scanlon, 473 U .S. 234, 242 (1985))
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judiciary should now reject legislative history when construing
federal statutes implicating the balance between federal and state
power.221
As an initial matter, we must have some understanding of what
the Court believes the “usual constitutional balance between the
States and the Federal Government” to be. According to Gregory,
striking this balance involves what is commonly referred to as “dual
federalism.”222 Although largely abandoned after the New Deal,
dualism of this sort has become a centerpiece in much of the Court’s
recent federalism jurisprudence.223 As Professor Schapiro has
described it, dualism requires that “the states and the federal
government exercise exclusive control over nonoverlapping regions
of authority, that these realms of exclusive control are defined by
subject matter, and that the federal courts play an important and
distinctive role in guarding the boundaries of state and federal
terrain.”224 The general subject matter in Gregory was the establishment of employment requirements of state constitutional officers,
judges specifically. Concluding that this was an area traditionally
regulated by the states which also involved an irreducible element
of state sovereignty,225 the Court held that Congress would have to
clearly and specifically invoke its powers under the Commerce
Clause to interfere with it.226
This idea of a “usual balance” also assumes some default proportionality between federal and state power. Prior to the New Deal,
the Court assumed that this default balance favored federal
regulation in those areas where Congress chose to legislate.227
According to one commentator, all preemption under the Commerce
Clause, for instance, was what we would now regard as field

(internal quotation m arks om itted).
221. It is possible that, to the extent that it seeks to im pose a particular m eans of statutory
interpretation on the courts through the force of stare decisis, G regory w as w rongly decided.
See supra note 170.
222. 501 U .S. at 460.
223. See Schapiro, supra note 43, at 46-52.
224. Id. at 34.
225. See 501 U .S. at 460.
226. Id. at 470.
227. D avid S. Schw artz, C orrecting Federalism M istakes in Statutory Interpretation: The
Suprem e C ourt and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 L AW & C ONTEMP. P ROBS. 5, 23 (2004).
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preemption.228 “If Congress enacted a commerce regulation ... unless
it expressly saved state law, it was deemed to have occupied the
field, and no state regulation on the subject would be permitted.”229
Since then, the areas of local concern to which the commerce power
extends have expanded, but the federalism default has changed.
Instead of assuming that Congress intends to supplant state regulation when legislating under the Commerce Clause, the Court will
now assume that Congress did not intend to do so.230 The clear
statement requirement thus has a practical effect that is similar
to that of Sandoval and the Court’s implied statutory remedies
jurisprudence. It makes congressional legislation reducing state
regulatory power more difficult to draft and to adopt, and it does so
by presuming a default balance in favor of state power while
simultaneously narrowing the evidence of congressional intent that
can be invoked to counterbalance it.
C. The Centralization Default
There are clear parallels between the Court’s approach to preemption cases and its approach to the “new federalism” cases
described above. Both immerse the Court in questions of federalism,
statutory interpretation, and the relationship between them. That
being said, there is a critical difference in how the Court resolves
these questions in the two contexts: the default rule underlying
many of the Court’s preemption cases is different from the default
rule underlying its new federalism cases.231 This observation may
seem patently wrong at first blush: after all, the Court has insisted
in some cases that it will not presume that Congress intended to
preempt state law in areas where the states have traditionally
controlled regulation.232 It is all the more surprising given that this

228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See Gardbaum , supra note 30, at 806.
231. See Fallon, supra note 144, at 471 (observing that the C ourt has “bypassed
opportunities to prom ote federalism through doctrines involving ... federal preem ption”);
Sam uel Issacharoff & C atherine M . Sharkey, B ackdoor Federalization, 53 U C LA L. R EV . 1353
(2006) (arguing that the C ourt has em ployed preem ption to protect em erging national
com m ercial m arkets from the negative externalities im posed by hostile state regulation).
232. See infra note 321.
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presumption is consistent with the largely state-favoring work of the
Court’s new federalism cases. These cases indicate that the default
rule of “Our Federalism” is that states hold regulatory sway absent
overt and specific indications by Congress to the contrary.233
From a practical standpoint, however, and as several scholars
have pointed out, the presumption against preemption does not
play an important role in the Court’s preemption jurisprudence.234
To the contrary, the Court has repeatedly hinted at a Centralization
Default, which makes it more difficult for Congress to choose an
antipreemption policy scheme.235
As Professors Greve and Klick have noted, there is a perceived
discontinuity “between the Rehnquist Court’s federalism cases and
its preemption decisions.”236 They have further observed that “[i]n
preemption law ... the justices often seem to ‘switch sides’: liberals
almost always vote ‘against the states’ in federalism cases—and
often against preemption, and thus ‘for the states,’ in preemption
cases. Conservative justices often flip-flop in the opposite direction.”237 In describing the preemption decisions of the Supreme
Court’s 1999 term, Professor Fallon observed that “[f]our of the
233. See supra Part II.B .
234. See E rw in Chem erinsky, E m pow ering States W hen It M atters: A Different A pproach
to Preem ption, 69 B ROOK . L. R EV . 1313, 1318-24 (2004) (arguing that the C ourt has abandoned
the presum ption against preem ption, w hich em bodies the federalism considerations at the
heart of preem ption policym aking); Sharkey, supra note 13, at 458.
235. Several Justices have hinted at tw o other default rules that have yet to gain m ajority
support. The first is a rem edial default rule im plied by Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion
in R iegel. There she observed that “[i]t is ‘difficult to believe that C ongress w ould, w ithout
com m ent, rem ove all m eans of judicial recourse’ for large num bers of consum ers injured by
defective m edical devices.” R iegel v. M edtronic, Inc., 552 U .S. 312, 337 (G insburg, J.
dissenting) (quoting Silkw ood v. K err-M cG ee Corp., 464 U .S. 238, 251 (1984)); cf. Schapiro,
supra note 43, at 51 (asserting that a presum ption of concurrent state and federal regulatory
involvem ent “w ould decrease im plied preem ption of state law s”). A sim ilar sentim ent was
expressed by the dissenters (Stevens, K ennedy, Souter, and G insburg) in M edtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U .S. 470, 487. This rem edial default w ould force C ongress to clearly express its
intent to elim inate state tort rem edies without providing a federal alternative. The second is
a state autonom y default rule cham pioned solely by Justice Thom as. The effect of such a
default is to drastically reduce the frequency of federal preem ption. It w ould elim inate m ost
of the im plied preem ption doctrines, and w ould presum e the prim acy of state regulatory
regim es absent an actual conflict betw een state and federal law or an express statutory
directive from C ongress. See Sharkey, supra note 33, at 65-70.
236. M ichael S. G reve & Jonathan K lick, Preem ption in the R ehnquist C ourt: A Prelim inary
E m pirical Assessm ent, 14 S UP. C T. E CON . R EV . 43, 47 (2006).
237. Id.
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Court’s five most conservative, generally pro-federalism justices ...
found federal preemption in each instance, and Justice Thomas
agreed in every case but one.”238 More recent statistical studies of
the Court’s preemption jurisprudence have also shown that the
Court has generally been more sympathetic to claims of preemption.239 Speaking specifically of the Roberts Court, Dean
Chemerinsky has observed that the Court, far from adopting a
presumption against preemption, has actually adopted a presumption in favor of it.240 The reason for this trend may be policy-driven.
The Justices may generally be more inclined to favor regulatory
efficiency as opposed to corrective justice or state-regarding
federalism. Doing so would lean the Court toward preemption
instead of away from it. As already discussed, Justice Scalia’s
statement in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., regarding the comparative
decisional competence of state legislatures and state juries, supports
such an inference.241 Others have suggested that this trend is driven
by political party interests.242
The reason may also be doctrinal, in the sense that the Court’s
implied preemption tests overwhelm the limitations that would
otherwise be set by its express preemption tests. In Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, the Court stated that Congress’s inclusion of a
preemption clause in a statutory scheme should serve as the sole
evidence of its preemptive intent.243 The implicit corollary was that
federal courts should not resort to extratextual methods of statutory
interpretation to infer the existence or extent of Congress’s preemp238. See Fallon, supra note 144, at 472.
239. S ee G reve & K lick, supra note 236, at 52, 57 tbl.5 (finding that 52 percent of 105
preem ption decisions from the R ehnquist C ourt era w ere decided in favor of preem ption;
finding 62.5 percent preem ption rate in 32 products liability cases involving preem ption of
state com m on-law tort claim s from 1986 to 2004; and finding that the rate increases to 67.6
percent w hen cases are restricted to the “Second R ehnquist C ourt,” beginning in 1994).
240. C hem erinsky, supra note 234, at 1318-24; see also Erwin Chem erinsky, The R oberts
C ourt at Age Three, 54 W AYNE L. R EV . 947, 968-72 (2008) (noting, as of the w riting of the
article, that “[e]very preem ption case decided so far by the R oberts C ourt ha[d] been decided
in favor of finding preem ption”); M etzger, supra note 89, at 10 (observing that the C ourt has
tended to favor preem ption over the last decade).
241. See supra Part I.A .
242. See generally Linda S. M ullenix, Strange B edfellow s: The Politics of Preem ption, 59
C ASE W . R ES. L. R EV . 837, 839-43 (2009) (discussing the alliance on preem ption issues of
otherw ise opposed business and political interest groups).
243. 505 U .S. 504, 517 (1992).
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tive intent.244 Such methods are more appropriately reserved for
when Congress’s intent cannot be inferred from the text due to its
vagueness, ambiguities, or omissions.
The Court has reversed course since Cipollone, emphasizing instead that “the existence of conflict cognizable under the Supremacy
Clause does not depend on express congressional recognition that
federal and state law may conflict.”245 Although an express preemption or saving clause can be clear evidence of Congress’s preemptive
intent, it may not be definitive evidence. The Court can still displace
or eliminate state regulatory activity, and it will do so without
regard to whether Congress has included an express preemption or
saving clause in the statutory language.
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. serves as an example.246
There the Court addressed whether federal automobile safety
regulations promulgated under the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVSA) preempted a state tort action alleging
that the defendant automaker negligently failed to equip the
plaintiff ’s car with driver’s side airbags.247 The NTMVSA included
express preemption and saving clauses, the latter providing that
“‘compliance with’ a federal safety standard ‘does not exempt any
person from any liability under common law.’”248 The Court first
concluded that the NTMVSA did not expressly preempt state
common law actions.249 The Court then determined that “the saving
clause (like the express pre-emption provision) does not bar the
ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.”250 Finally, the
Court held that the plaintiff ’s state tort suit was preempted because
it “stood as an obstacle” to the attainment of federal objectives.251
Other of the Court’s preemption cases also point out that the

244. C f. id.
245. C rosby v. N at’l Foreign Trade C ouncil, 530 U .S. 363, 388 (2000) (citing H ines v.
D avidowitz, 312 U .S. 52, 67 (1941)).
246. 529 U .S. 861 (2000).
247. Id. at 865.
248. Id. at 868 (alteration om itted) (quoting 15 U .S.C . § 1397(k) (1998)).
249. Id. (“W e have found no convincing indication that C ongress w anted to pre-em pt, not
only state statutes and regulations, but also com m on-law tort actions.”).
250. Id. at 869.
251. Id. at 881.
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presence of explicit, statutory expression of Congress’s preemptive
intent may not definitively resolve the preemption question.252
Given Geier and similar cases, one could reasonably ask what
Congress could have possibly done differently; it enacted a saving
clause that explicitly preserved state tort claims even when the
manufacturer complied with federal regulations. Assuming, as
seems reasonable, that Congress did not actually intend regulations
promulgated under the NTMVSA to preempt state tort claims, Geier
illustrates the importance of understanding the Court’s preemption
leanings and addressing them. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion
assumed that Congress would want the Court to apply “ordinary
pre-emption principles”253 when the Court discovered a conflict or an
obstacle. This seems to also assume that Congress did not itself
identify such conflicts or obstacles but would have resolved them in
favor of preemption if it had. The operative presumption, then, is
that where a state law conflicts or interferes with federal regulation,
Congress always intends the state law to yield unless there is a
sufficiently specific and contrary indication.254 This does not seem
to be an unreasonable presumption, but it may nevertheless be
wrong in some instances. The general lesson from Geier is as
follows: where Congress recognizes the possibility of a conflict or
state-based obstacle but nevertheless wants to yield to state
authority, the Centralization Default requires it to clearly state as
much.255

252. See Sprietsm a v. M ercury M arine, 537 U .S. 51, 64-65 (2002) (“C ongress’s inclusion of
an express pre-em ption clause ‘does not bar the ordinary w orking of conflict pre-em ption
principles.’” (quoting G eier, 529 U .S. at 869)); Freightliner C orp. v. M yrick, 514 U .S. 280, 28788 (1995) (describing as “w ithout m erit” the assertion that “im plied pre-em ption cannot exist
w hen Congress has chosen to include an express pre-em ption clause in a statute”).
253. G eier, 529 U .S. at 871.
254. Justice B reyer m ade a sim ilar observation in B arnett B ank v. N elson. 517 U .S. 25, 30
(1996) (“[The preem ption] question is basically one of congressional intent. D id C ongress, in
enacting the Federal Statute, intend to exercise its constitutionally delegated authority to set
aside the law s of a State? If so, the Suprem acy C lause requires courts to follow federal, not
state, law .”).
255. 529 U .S. at 868, 871-72 (concluding that w hile Congress has the pow er to select the
state law in a state/federal conflict, “there is no reason to believe C ongress has done so here”).
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III. L EGISLATING P REEMPTION IN C ONTEXT : T HE D ODD -F RANK A CT
Congress has two core decisions to make when crafting preemption legislation. First, it must decide whether to delegate primary
implementation authority to courts or to administrative agencies.
Administrative agencies are more susceptible to congressional
monitoring256 and hence more susceptible to correction when they
drift away from Congress’s preemption policy choices.257 Despite this
fact, Congress either fails to make an explicit delegation decision,
leaving the task to the courts by default, or specifically chooses
courts over agencies. Second, assuming that preemption delegation
has primarily fallen to the courts, Congress must craft its legislation
to be responsive to the Supreme Court’s Centralization Default.
Whether Congress resorts to clear rules, broad standards, robust
legislative histories, or some combination thereof, will largely
depend on whether it must overcome the Centralization Default or
whether it can take advantage of it.
The ambitious national bank preemption scheme set out in the
Dodd-Frank Act provides a timely and interesting case to which to
apply the foregoing analytical framework. As described below,258
Congress attempted to provide states with a greater role in the
provision of consumer protections, and it did so by reducing the
preemptive power held by the OCC and the OTS and by increasing
the preemptive authority of the federal courts. Given Congress’s
monitoring challenges with respect to the Court, and given the
Centralization Default, there is reason to be skeptical about the
Act’s institutional choices. This Part begins with a brief history of
national banking regulation, which provides the political and
regulatory backdrop against which Congress drafted the DoddFrank Act’s national bank preemption provisions. It then describes
those provisions, focusing on their delegation of preemption
authority to the courts and the preemption standard that the Act
adopts. The Part concludes with an assessment of the likely
effectiveness of the Act’s national bank preemption scheme, given
256. B eerm ann, supra note 126, at 122-23.
257. See supra notes 123-30 and accom panying text.
258. See infra notes 263-66 and accom panying text.
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the monitoring and Centralization Default considerations discussed
in previous sections of the Article.
A. Congressional Responses to Expanded National Bank
Preemption
The years preceding the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act saw a
significant expansion of federal banking regulation. Beginning in
the 1990s, the OCC and OTS relied on preemption arguments to
assert greater regulatory authority over the state-chartered
affiliates and subsidiaries of national banks and federal thrifts.259
For federal thrifts, courts gave the Home Owners’ Loan Act
(HOLA),260 and regulations promulgated pursuant to it by the OTS
field preemptive effect.261 Over the same period, Congress, the
courts, and the OCC greatly expanded the scope of federal preemption of state laws applicable to national bank activities. For example, in 1994, Congress enacted the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994,262 which permitted national
banks to open branches in multiple states.263 In an opinion letter
issued shortly thereafter, the OCC granted national banks the
power to export interest rates from both the state in which the bank
was headquartered and the state in which one of its branches was
located.264 This decision allowed national banks to select the highest
available interest rate regardless of state laws that would have
otherwise prohibited them.265
Two years later, the Supreme Court decided Barnett Bank v.
Nelson, which invalidated a state insurance law prohibiting national
259. A rthur E . W ilm arth, Jr., The O C C ’s Preem ption R ules E xceed the Agency’s Authority
and Present a Serious Threat to the D ual B anking System and Consum er Protection, 23 A NN .
R EV . B ANKING & F IN . L. 225, 283-84 (2004).
260. 12 U .S.C . § 1461 (2006).
261. See Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan A ss’n, 396 F.3d 178, 183-84 (2d C ir. 2005); B ank of
A m . v. City of S.F., 309 F.3d 551, 558 (9th C ir. 2002) (“This court has recognized that
regulation of federal savings associations by the O TS has been so ‘pervasive as to leave no
room for state regulatory control.’” (quoting C onference of Fed. Sav. & Loan A ss’ns v. Stein,
604 F.2d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1979), aff’ d, 445 U .S. 921 (1980))).
262. 12 U .S.C . § 1811 (2006).
263. Id. § 1842(d); see also M atthew D yckm an et al., Financial R egulatory R eform — The
D odd-Frank Act R olls B ack Federal Preem ption, 64 C ONSUMER F IN . L. Q . R EP. 129, 158 (2010).
264. See Dyckm an et al., supra note 263, at 274.
265. See id.
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banks from selling insurance in towns of 5,000 or fewer residents.266
The Court in essence applied conflict and obstacle preemption
standards to national banks, deeming preempted state laws that
“prevent or significantly interfere” with a national bank’s exercise
of its federally granted powers.267 In 2004, and largely in response
to the Barnett Bank decision, the OCC issued two rules that further
expanded the scope of federal preemption. The first provided that
national banks and their operating subsidiaries were immune from
state laws that “obstruct, impair or condition” a national bank’s
exercise of its powers to make loans or to take deposits. 268 The
intended effect was to preempt almost all state consumer protection
laws regulating the lending activities of national banks. The second
rule restricted the authority of states to exercise so-called
“visitorial” powers on national banks and their nonbank operating
affiliates, making their examination the exclusive province of the
OCC.269 These regulations were consistently upheld by the lower
federal courts, which Chevron deferred to the OCC’s interpretation
of the preemptive scope of the National Bank Act.270 Moreover, the
Court in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. upheld the OCC’s assertion of exclusive visitorial authority.271 Although the Court’s
subsequent decision in Cuomo refused to extend the OCC’s preemptive powers to state enforcement of state fair lending laws against
national banks,272 it also declined to rule out the possibility that
Chevron deference applied to the OCC’s interpretation of the NBA’s
preemptive scope.273
Due to this sustained expansion of federal banking preemption
and the upheaval caused by the recent economic crisis, many
antipreemption advocates viewed the OCC, the OTS, Congress, and
266. 517 U .S. 25, 29, 37 (1996).
267. Id. at 33.
268. 12 C .F.R . §§ 7.4009, 34.4 (2010).
269. Id. § 7.4000.
270. See N at’l C ity B ank of Ind. v. Turnbaugh, 463 F.3d 325, 331-33 (4th C ir. 2006) (citing
W ells Fargo B ank N .A. v. B outris, 419 F.3d 949, 958 (9th C ir. 2005); W achovia B ank, N .A . v.
B urke, 414 F.3d 305, 315 (2d C ir. 2005); W achovia B ank, N .A . v. W atters, 431 F.3d 556, 560
(6th C ir. 2005)).
271. 550 U .S. 1, 6-7 (2007).
272. See Cuom o v. C learing H ouse A ss’n, 129 S. C t. 2710, 2720-21 (2009).
273. See id. at 2715 (invoking “the fam iliar Chevron fram ew ork,” but not explicitly applying
that fram ework to the O C C ’s interpretation of “visitorial pow ers” as used in the N B A ).
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the federal courts as being hostile to robust consumer protection
laws,274 most of which were adopted and enforced at the state level.
Suspicion of the OCC in particular has been profound over the past
two decades, with many outside observers concluding that the
agency has been too solicitous of the national banks it is charged
with regulating, or so single-mindedly focused on its mandate to
ensure the soundness of national banks that it has consistently
neglected competing consumer protection concerns.275
Although the Dodd-Frank Act clearly attempts to respond by
scaling back the dominant role played by federal administrative
agencies in consumer financial protection, it does so in a way that
shows Congress’s preference for delegating rather than resolving
difficult and potentially contentious preemption issues.276 A primary
example is the Act’s codification of the preemption standard used in
Barnett Bank.277
As the process that led to the Act’s codification of Barnett Bank
demonstrates, the substantive preemption standard to be applied to
the NBA and the HOLA was a matter of significant disagreement.
The Treasury Department had initially proposed the adoption of a
bright-line, mandatory rule eliminating federal preemption of
generally applicable state consumer protection laws. 278 This
proposal gained little traction in Congress, and the House Financial
Services Committee chose instead to propose a standard-based
approach that limits preemption to situations in which state law
“prevents, significantly interferes [with], or materially impairs” the
capacity of a national bank to conduct its banking business. In other
words, the Committee chose selected portions of the Barnett Bank
274. See M ark Furletti, Com m ent, The D ebate over the N ational B ank Act and the
Preem ption of State Efforts to R egulate C redit C ards, 77 T EMP. L. R EV . 425, 447 (2004)
(describing vociferous state and interest group criticism of the O C C’s preem ption policies).
275. See M etzger, supra note 89, at 27 & nn.122-23; W ilm arth, supra note 259, at 352-53.
276. D odd-Frank W all Street R eform and C onsum er Protection Act, Pub. L. N o. 111-203,
§ 1044(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2015-16 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U .S.C . § 75b). The one
possible exception to the A ct’s general thrust of preem ption delegation is its overruling of the
C ourt’s decision in W atters, which ruled that federal preem ption extends to the activities of
a national bank’s subsidiaries and affiliates as w ell as to the activities of the bank itself. See
id. § 1044(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 2015.
277. Id. § 1044(b)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 2015.
278. U .S. D EP’T OF THE T REASURY , F INANCIAL R EGULATORY R EFORM , A N EW F OUNDATION :
R EBUILDING F INANCIAL S UPERVISION AND R EGULATION 62 (2009) [hereinafter Treasury W hite
Paper].
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decision as its preemption standard. Believing that the Committee’s
selection too narrowly construed the breadth of preemption permitted by Barnett Bank, Representative Melissa Bean of Illinois
proposed additional, pro-preemption language.279 The Senate
Banking Committee went even further, including a citation to
Barnett Bank itself in the Act’s final language.280 While the House
initially rejected this change, it eventually agreed to it.281
This procedural history of Barnett Bank’s codification shows that
it was not intended to completely unfetter the states’ authority to
apply their consumer protection laws to national banks and federal
thrifts. There was insufficient political will, and hence an insufficient number of House and Senate votes, to eliminate federal preemption altogether as suggested by the Treasury Department.
Rather, Barnett Bank ’s inclusion was intended to provide states
with significantly greater regulatory authority than they were
previously afforded by the OTS and the OCC,282 while also preserving federal power to provide the exclusive rules of decisions in
particular circumstances.
Despite this continuous back-and-forth regarding the Barnett
Bank preemption standard, and despite the high level of suspicion
with which the OCC was regarded, there was never any serious
attempt to enumerate the specific categories of state consumer
financial protection laws or specific bank activities that would be
subject to federal preemption. With the House’s rejection of the
Treasury Department’s blanket ban on federal preemption, the crux
of the ensuing argument was not whether the courts and the OCC
would be delegated the authority to determine which state laws the
preemption standard displaces. All of the House and Senate bills
distributed preemption policymaking authority relating to national
279. See Tim othy R . M cTaggart & Travis P. N elson, H ouse Passes M ajor Financial Services
R eform Package, F IN . S VCS. A LERT (Pepper H am ilton LLP, W ashington, D.C .), Dec. 29, 2009,
at 1-2, available at http://w w w.pepperlaw .com /pdfs/FSA lert122909.pdf.
280. S. R EP. N O . 111-176, at 175 (2010).
281. H .R . R EP. N O . 111-517, at 652 (2010) (Conf. R ep.).
282. W hereas the OC C preem ption regulation applies to deposit and lending laws that
“obstruct, im pair, or condition” the capacity of national banks to exercise their federally
created pow ers, Barnett B ank does not preem pt state law s that m erely place conditions on the
exercise of those pow ers. A dditionally, the now -defunct OTS preem ption regulation provided
for field preem ption of all state deposit and lending law s. U nder B arnett B ank, som e such
state law s are now applicable to federal thrifts.
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banks and federal thrifts among the proposed Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection (CFPB), the OCC, and the courts.283 Rather, the
crux of the argument was how best to guide the preemption discretion that was certainly going to be granted to the courts and to
the OCC. As neither the Dodd-Frank Act nor the Barnett Bank
decision define any of the key terms that constitute the Act’s substantive preemption standard, the courts and the OCC are necessarily left to exercise substantial discretion in construing and applying
them.284 In the end, both the House and the Senate left the preemption delegation system that preceded the Act intact, while merely
changing the parameters of its delegations.285
B. The Dodd-Frank Act’s Institutional Choices
As important as the preemption standard adopted by the Act is
its shift of primary preemption policymaking and implementation
authority from the OCC and the OTS to the courts. The Act places
substantial procedural limitations on OCC preemption decision
making without placing similar limitations on the courts. The Act
also subjects OCC preemption decisions to far more robust judicial
review than previously deemed appropriate by the Supreme Court.
With respect to the procedural limitations placed on the OCC,
section 1044(b)(1)(B) restricts it to “case-by-case” determinations of
whether state consumer financial laws are preempted by the NBA;
the effect of an OCC preemption determination is limited to the
particular state law it is asked to consider.286 In the event that the
283. See Dodd-Frank A ct, Pub. L. N o. 111-203, §§ 1041-1048, 124 Stat. 1376, 2011-18
(2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U .S.C .). The A ct also elim inated the O TS and
distributed its regulatory responsibility am ong the Federal R eserve, the FD IC , and the O C C .
See id. §§ 312-313, 124 Stat. at 1521-23.
284. See Lem os, supra note 54, at 372.
285. That the preem ption provisions, like other aspects of the A ct, were subject to
substantial disagreem ent is further evidenced by the closeness of the ultim ate votes that led
to its passage. The conference report resolving the differences betw een the H ouse and Senate
versions passed the H ouse by a vote of 237 to 192, and barely bypassed the filibuster in the
Senate by a vote of 60 to 39. H .R . 4173: D odd-Frank W all Street R eform and Consum er
Protection Act, G OV T RACK , http://w w w .govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-4173 (last
visited Sept. 23, 2011).
286. See § 1044(b)(1)(B ), 124 Stat. at 2015 (“[A ]ny preem ption determ ination under this
subparagraph m ay be m ade by a court, or by regulation or order of the Com ptroller of the
C urrency on a case-by-case basis, in accordance w ith applicable law .”); see also id. §
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OCC deems it prudent to preempt the laws of other states that are
substantially similar to the one it has specifically been asked to
consider, it must consult with the CFPB and take the CFPB’s
position into account before proceeding.287 The Act imposes no such
requirement on judicial preemption determinations.288
Beyond simply placing procedural burdens on the OCC that the
courts do not share, section 1044(b)(5)(A) and section 1044(c)
directly subordinate the OCC to the courts in the preemption policymaking hierarchy.289 Section 1044(b)(5)(A) substantially reduces
the level of deference afforded OCC preemption determinations
when those determinations are the subject of judicial review.290 In
Cuomo, the Court applied Chevron deference to the OCC’s interpretation of the NBA and, as a direct consequence, to the OCC’s
preemption determination.291 Section 1044(b)(5)(B) reverses that
aspect of the case, instead directing courts reviewing any preemption determinations made by the OCC “[to] assess the validity of
such determinations, depending upon the thoroughness evident in
1044(b)(3)(A), 124 Stat. at 2015 (defining “case-by-case basis” as “a determ ination pursuant
to this section m ade by the C om ptroller concerning the im pact of a particular State consum er
financial law on any national bank that is subject to that law , or the law of any other State
w ith substantively equivalent term s”).
287. See id. § 1044(b)(3)(B ), 124 Stat. at 2015.
288. G iven that § 1044(b)(1)(B ) separates its reference to courts and its reference to the
O CC by a com m a, the fairest reading of the subsection is that courts m ay m ake preem ption
determ inations in accordance with applicable law , w hereas the OCC m ust m ake its
preem ption determ inations on a case-by-case basis in accordance w ith applicable law. See
supra note 287. This reading is buttressed by the fact that the Senate rejected the H ouse
version of this language, w hich grouped courts and the OC C together in the sam e clause, and
then stated that their determ inations w ould be subject to the case-by-case lim itation. See W all
Street R eform and C onsum er Protection A ct of 2009, H .R . 4173, 111th Cong. § 4404(b)(1)(B )
(2009) (“Any preem ption determ ination under this subparagraph m ay be m ade by a court or
by regulation or order of the C om ptroller of the C urrency in accordance w ith applicable law ,
on a case-by-case basis.”).
289. § 1044(b)(5)(A ), (c), 124 Stat. at 2015-16.
290. Id. § 1044(b)(5)(A), 124 Stat. at 2015-16.
291. See C uom o v. C learing H ouse A ss’n, 129 S. C t. 2710, 2715, 2721 (2009). In W atters,
the C ourt conspicuously side-stepped w hether C hevron deference applied to the O C C ’s
preem ption determ inations. See E van J. C riddle, C hevron’s C onsensus, 88 B .U . L. R EV . 1271,
1307 & n.187 (2008) (noting that W atters w as one of several cases in w hich the Suprem e C ourt
review ed agency interpretations of am biguous statutory language and either neglected to
m ention Chevron, or m entioned it w ithout supporting analysis); A nn Graham , Searching for
C hevron in M uddy W atters: The R oberts C ourt and Judicial R eview of Agency R egulations,
60 A DMIN . L . R EV . 229, 232 (2008) (noting that C hevron analysis w as “m issing in action” in
W atters).
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the consideration of the agency, the validity of the reasoning of the
agency, the consistency with other valid determinations made by the
agency, and other factors which the court finds persuasive and
relevant to its decision.”292 Stated differently, the Act downgrades
the level of deference that courts must afford OCC preemption
determinations from Chevron to Skidmore. Even if the OCC’s
interpretations of ambiguous and potentially preemptive provisions
are reasonable—and would thus have required acceptance by the
courts under Chevron—the courts are no longer obliged to accept
them. Instead, the courts may determine the preemptive scope of
the Act and the NBA largely independent of the OCC; they need
only give consideration to the OCC’s opinion. In the event of a
disagreement, the tie now goes to the courts.
Congress did not stop at reducing the level of judicial deference
accorded to OCC preemption determinations. Section 1044(c)
further subordinates the OCC to the courts by imposing a “substantial evidence” requirement for any of its preemption determinations.293 Two aspects of this provision are somewhat puzzling. First,
it instructs courts to apply the “substantial evidence” test in
accordance with the Court’s decision in Barnett Bank, which did not
apply or even mention the substantial evidence test.294 Second, the
substantial evidence test, as it is commonly applied to judicial
review of administrative agency determinations,295 is relevant to
questions of fact and policy, but not to questions of law. Preemption
may conceivably, or perhaps even properly, turn on questions of
fact,296 but that is not how courts currently understand it. Rather,
292. § 1044(b)(5)(A ), 124 Stat. at 2015-16.
293. Id. § 1044(c), 124 Stat. at 2016.
294. See supra text accom panying notes 266-69.
295. See, e.g., N LR B v. C olum bian E nam eling & Stam ping C o., 306 U .S . 292, 300 (1939)
(describing “substantial evidence” as “enough to justify, if the trial w ere to a jury, a refusal
to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be draw n from it is one of fact for the jury”).
296. For instance, it m ay be that em pirical evidence relating to the practical im pact that
diverse state regulatory regim es have had on regulated industries could usefully inform
preem ption analysis. Cf. M errill, supra note 10, at 776 (asserting that Skidm ore deference to
agency preem ption determ inations does not “channel attention to those aspects of the
preem ption decision w here the agency can provide the m ost help to the court, nam ely in
assessing the practical im pact of diverse state rules on the objective of m aintaining a single
integrated com m ercial m arket”); Sharkey, supra note 13, at 477-502 (describing an “agency
reference m odel” in w hich courts w ould adopt a m odified Skidm ore deference standard to take
advantage of the fact-finding capacities of agencies).
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courts currently understand it as purely a question of law.297 Section
1044(c)’s implications are, accordingly, an open question.298 On the
one hand, section 1044(c) may require courts to determine whether
the OCC has based its preemption determinations on demonstrable
evidence, or sufficiently compelling forecasting,299 tending to show
that state law conflicts with or poses an obstacle to federal law. If
this is the case, the section provides courts with no guidance as to
evidentiary sufficiency.300 On the other hand, it is possible, though
297. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & E lec. C o. v. State E nergy R es. C onservation & D ev. C om m ’n, 461
U .S. 190, 201 (1983) (holding the challenge to a C alifornia law ripe because “[t]he question
of pre-em ption is predom inantly legal, and although it would be useful to have the benefit of
C alifornia’s interpretation of w hat constitutes a dem onstrated technology or m eans for the
disposal of high-level nuclear w aste, resolution of the pre-em ption issue need not aw ait that
developm ent”); E lassaad v. Independence A ir, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 124 (3d C ir. 2010) (observing
that preem ption is a question of law ); B oom er v. A T& T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 422 n.10 (7th C ir.
2002) (“[T]he issue of preem ption involves a pure question of law .”); Dow C hem . C o. v. E xxon
C orp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1473-79 (Fed. C ir. 1998) (observing that preem ption is a question of law
review ed de novo); U nited States v. R .I. Insurers’ Insolvency Fund, 80 F.3d 616, 619 (1st C ir.
1996) (“[A ] federal preem ption ruling presents a pure question of law subject to plenary
review .”); B aker v. Farm ers E lec. C oop., Inc., 34 F.3d 274, 278 (5th C ir. 1994) (“Preem ption
is a question of law review ed de novo.”).
298. In a som ew hat different context, Judge M cG ow an expressed frustration about a
sim ilar problem relating to C ongress’s requirem ent that the courts review for substantial
evidence rules “prom ulgated by the Secretary of Labor under the O ccupational Safety and
H ealth A ct of 1970”:
This direct review proceeding presents a classic case of what Judge Friendly has
aptly term ed “a new form of uneasy partnership” between agency and court that
results w henever C ongress delegates decision m aking of a legislative character
to the one, subject to review by the other. The angularity of this relationship is
only sharpened when, as here, C ongress— w ith no apparent aw areness of
anom aly— has explicitly com bined an inform al agency procedure w ith a standard
of review traditionally conceived of as suited to form al adjudication or
rulem aking. The federal courts, hard pressed as they are by the flood of new
tasks im posed upon them by C ongress, surely have som e claim to be spared
additional burdens deriving from the illogic of legislative com prom ise. A t the
least, it w ould have been helpful if there had been som e recognition by C ongress
that the quick answ er it gave to a legislative stalem ate posed serious problem s
for a review ing court, and that there would inevitably have to be som e latitude
accorded it to surm ount those problem s consistently w ith the legislative
purposes. T he duty rem ains, in any event, to decide the case before us in
accordance w ith our statutory m andate, how ever dim ly the rationale, if any,
underlying it can be perceived.
Indus. U nion D ep’t, A FL-CIO v. H odgson, 499 F.2d 467, 469-70 (D .C . C ir. 1974) (citation
om itted).
299. B ut see id. at 472-76 (enum erating the problem s associated w ith judicial review of
policy and predictive factual findings).
300. A gain, it is unlikely that B arnett Bank can be of any assistance here, as it does not
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substantially less likely, that section 1044(c) requires courts to
determine whether the OCC has considered sufficient evidence of
Congress’s preemptive intent. If that is the case, then the implications for statutory interpretation are staggering, given the adoption
of textualist interpretive methods by several of the Justices on the
Supreme Court. It would be all but impossible under such a construction for courts to ignore extratextual evidence of general
congressional intent and specific legislative history.
Regardless of whether section 1044(c) requires the OCC to point
to some factual evidence that state law conflicts or interferes with
federal law, to detailed forecasting that suggests the likelihood of
such conflicts or interference, or to some factual evidence of what
Congress actually intended by its statutory language, the implications of mandating judicial review under the substantial evidence
test are clear. Requiring the OCC to produce a record of the evidence on which it relied when it made a preemption determination
would also require the onerous, costly, and time-consuming formal
rule-making or adjudication procedures301 required by sections 556
and 557 of the Administrative Procedure Act.302 This further, or
perhaps completely, undermines the ability of the OCC to promulgate rules regarding preemption. By contrast, courts are accustomed
to conducting such proceedings, and can presumably do so much
more effectively than the OCC.
Moreover, it is possible that requiring substantial evidence review
would force the OCC to explicitly consider each of the corrective
justice, federalism, and regulatory efficiency considerations that

m ention or otherw ise rely on the substantial evidence test. See supra text accom panying notes
266-71.
301. See A ndrew P. M orriss et al., C hoosing H ow To R egulate, 29 H ARV . E NVTL. L. R EV. 179,
179 n.2 (2005) (“[F]orm al rulem aking’s high costs m ade it an unattractive alternative for both
C ongress and regulators, m aking its use rare.”).
302. A dm inistrative Procedure A ct, 5 U .S.C . §§ 556-57 (2010). Requiring courts to review
agency decisions via substantial evidence affects the procedures that agencies em ploy w hen
m aking those decisions. See A erial B anners, Inc. v. FA A , 547 F.3d 1257, 1261 n.3 (11th C ir.
2008) (“Substantial evidence challenges m ay ... be raised to form al rulem akings pursuant to
5 U .S.C . § 556-57, or to ‘agency hearings provided by statute.’”) (quoting 5 U .S.C . § 706(2)(E )
(2006)); Indus. U nion D ep’t, 449 F.2d at 472-76 (noting that the Secretary of Labor, though
norm ally accustom ed to prom ulgating rules under notice-and-com m ent rulem aking,
nevertheless em ployed a form al rule-m aking procedure because of substantial evidence
review ).
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underlie every preemption decision,303 to make plain the evidentiary
proxies it uses to gauge the magnitude of each consideration, and to
indicate the relative importance of each to its ultimate conclusions.
Courts currently do not analyze preemption issues with such
exactitude or thoroughness.304 Nor does it appear on the face of the
Act that they would be required to do so now, though it is possible
that the burdens placed on the OCC could have some effect on how
the courts undertake the preemption inquiry in this context. In any
event, as with Congress’s elimination of the OTS,305 its reduction of
agency deference from Chevron to Skidmore, and its imposition of
the case-by-case requirement on the OCC, Congress clearly has
decided that the courts are more apt to give effect to its legislative
intentions than is the OCC and has attempted to empower the
courts accordingly.
C. Monitoring and the Centralization Default
As already described, the preemption provisions in the DoddFrank Act were Congress’s attempt to rein in what was widely perceived as overly aggressive preemption of state consumer financial
protection laws by the OCC and the OTS.306 In trying to expand
state autonomy in the provision of consumer financial protections,
Congress faced a choice of antipreemption strategies. It could have,
for example, specified bright-line antipreemption rules that, because
of their specificity, might not have been as comprehensive as their
sponsors wanted.307 Alternatively, Congress could have opted for a
purposivist-oriented strategy in which it enacted comparatively
broad standards, trusting that any ambiguities would be resolved

303. See Sharpe, supra note 5, at 371 (arguing that the balancing of federalism , corrective
justice, and regulatory efficiency considerations in the preem ption context is a quintessential
policy decision, and is not governed by universally accepted rules of law or logic).
304. C ourts frequently, and w ithout explanation, rely heavily on one or tw o of these
considerations w hile com pletely ignoring the others. This is particularly true of federalism
considerations. See supra Part II.C .
305. Title III of the D odd-F rank A ct elim inates the O TS, and transfers its pow ers to the
O CC and the Federal R eserve. H eidi M andanis S chooner, Private E nforcem ent of System ic
R isk R egulation, 43 C REIGHTON L. R EV . 993, 1005 n.48 (2010).
306. See supra Part III.A .
307. See supra Part III.A .
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by reference to the Act’s antipreemption legislative history.308
Congress ultimately chose the latter strategy, but did so without
due regard to either the Centralization Default or the Court’s
prevailing views on statutory interpretation.
As a general matter, the Dodd-Frank Act contains numerous
provisions intended to shift the balance of federal-state regulatory
responsibility by expanding the role of state regulators in providing
protections to consumers of financial products and services. For example, the Act grants significant powers to state attorneys general
and state regulators to enforce provisions of the Act, regulations
promulgated under the Act, and other laws that provide remedies
to aggrieved consumers.309 The Act also requires the CFPB to propose new consumer protection rules or modifications to existing
rules at the behest of a majority of the states,310 to explain its decision not to issue a rule to each state that proposed it,311 and to promulgate rules concerning coordination of enforcement actions with
state attorneys general.312 As described, the federal-state balance to
be struck through federal preemption was, in particular, a matter
of substantial disagreement among the Obama Administration, the
House of Representatives, and the Senate.313 What does not appear
to have been a matter of substantial disagreement, however, was
the empowerment of the courts as the primary guardian of the Act’s
preemption goals.
It would have behooved those members of Congress seeking to
ensure a reduction in federal consumer financial protection preemption to account for ex post monitoring considerations and the
Centralization Default. The decision in Barnett Bank, like all of the
Court’s preemption decisions that employ implied preemption
308. See supra Part II.B.1.
309. See, e.g., D odd-Frank W all Street R eform and C onsum er Protection A ct, Pub. L. N o.
111-203, § 1042, 124 S tat. 1376, 2012 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U .S.C . § 5552); id. §
1042(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 2012 (perm itting state attorneys general to enforce any provision of
the A ct or regulations prom ulgated under it in any federal or state court with jurisdiction over
the defendant); id. § 1042(d)(1)-(3), 124 Stat. at 2014 (preserving state authority to adopt
rules, initiate enforcem ent, or take action based on state claim s, state securities regulations,
or state insurance regulations).
310. Id. § 1041(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 2011.
311. Id. § 1041(c)(3)(B ), 124 Stat. at 2012.
312. Id. § 1042(c), 124 Stat. at 2014.
313. See supra Part III.A .
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analysis, is driven in large part by the preemption default rules
adopted by the Court. It seems that Congress’s best alternative for
substantially reducing federal preemption would have been to enact
clear, targeted preemption rules. Given their well-documented
propensity for preempting state law enforced against national banks
and federal thrifts,314 shifting the lion’s share of preemption policymaking responsibility away from the OCC and the OTS appeared to
be a logical first step in reducing the overall rate of consumer
financial protection preemption. In doing so, it also appears that
Congress failed to take account of the complex interplay between
statutory interpretation and federalism default rules that largely
drives the Supreme Court’s preemption decisions.
By all indications, the members of Congress who voted in favor of
the Dodd-Frank Act, or at least those who drafted the pertinent
preemption language, expected section 1044(b)(1)(B)’s citation to
Barnett Bank and the empowerment of the judiciary over the OCC
and the OTS to reduce the frequency with which state consumer
financial protection laws are preempted by federal law, thereby
increasing the role that states play in providing consumer financial
protections.315 In codifying Barnett Bank, Congress chose, by accident or by design, a purposivist-oriented standard that relies on a
combination of statutory text and interpretive nudging for ex post
preemption policy management.316 It then left the interpretation
and implementation tasks primarily to the courts. Congress’s choice
provides courts with substantial latitude in identifying the evidence that demonstrates a conflict with or impediment to federal
prerogatives, and substantial latitude in weighing that evidence
when reaching their preemption conclusions. Concomitantly, it
provides Congress with increased opportunities to influence judicial
interpretation through manipulation of legislative history. The
Barnett Bank decision itself, authored by Justice Breyer, relied on
at least six evidentiary sources, including legislative history, to
determine the intended preemptive effect of a 1916 federal statute
permitting national banks to sell insurance in small towns.317
314.
315.
316.
317.

See supra Part
See supra Part
See supra Part
A side from the

III.A .
III.B .
II.A .
text of the statute, 517 U .S. 25, 32 (1995), and its legislative history,
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Unlike the general rule of construction that was ultimately deleted
from the Civil Rights Act of 1991,318 or the guidance provided by the
Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act of 1995,319 section
1044(b)(1)(B) does not specify the interpretive methods the courts
should employ. Rather, the section indirectly encourages courts to
rely on legislative history by declining to provide clear instructions
on how Congress wanted to resolve particular preemption issues.
Unfortunately, section 1044(b)(1)(B) does not assert any control
over the courts’ preemption preferences, nor does it exhibit any
awareness of the Centralization Default. Unlike an amendment to
the MDA’s express preemption clause introduced in the Senate,320
or the presumption against preemption,321 section 1044(b)(1)(B) does
not instruct the courts to systematically favor the preservation of
state laws and regulations. It may be that this omission was caused
by the practical and political controversy surrounding the Act’s
preemption provisions and the inescapable difficulty of foreseeing
the specific preemption problems that the Act’s provisions would
id. at 35, Justice B reyer also relied on: (1) the Court’s prior precedents interpreting sim ilar
statutes, id.; (2) assum ptions about w hat Congress w ould norm ally have intended in sim ilar
situations, id. at 40-41; (3) ordinary E nglish/com m on sense m eanings of operative statutory
term s, id. at 38; and (4) Black’s Law D ictionary, id. Justice Breyer did not explicitly list these
sources, m ade no attem pt to specify the w eight he accorded to each of these sources, and did
not indicate w hether this list of sources w as exhaustive.
318. See Rodriguez, supra note 64, at 224-25.
319. U NIF. S TATUTE & R ULE C ONSTR . A CT § 20(c)(4) (1995).
320. In 2009, tw o S enators introduced a bill to “correct the Suprem e C ourt’s decision in
R iegel v. M edtronic, which m isconstrued the intent of C ongress and cut off access to our
N ation’s courts for citizens injured or killed by defective m edical devices.” 155 C ONG . R EC .
S1861 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2007) (2009) (statem ent of Sen. Leahy). The saving clause that the bill
w ould add to the M DA provides that “[n]othing in [§ 360k of the M DA] shall be construed to
m odify or otherw ise affect any action for dam ages or the liability of any person under the law
of any S tate.” M edical D evice Safety A ct of 2009, S. 540, 111th C ong. § 2(a) (2009). A n
identical bill has also been introduced in the H ouse of R epresentatives. See M edical D evice
Safety A ct of 2 0 0 9 , H .R . 1346, 111th C ong. § 2(a) (2009). N either bill has m oved out of its
respective com m ittee.
321. See supra Part II.C . U nlike som e other of the C ourt’s preem ption decisions, B arnett
B ank does not m ention the presum ption against preem ption in those areas traditionally
governed by state law . See, e.g., H illsborough Cnty. v. A utom ated M ed. Labs. Inc., 471 U .S.
707, 715 (1985) (“W here ... the field that C ongress is said to have pre-em pted has been
traditionally occupied by the S tates w e start w ith the assum ption that the historic police
pow ers of the States w ere not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that w as the clear
and m anifest purpose of C ongress.” (internal quotation m arks om itted)). Accordingly, it does
not necessarily follow that courts w ould apply it w hen construing the D odd-Frank Act’s
preem ption provisions.
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produce. Congress chose instead to leave the resolution of these
fretted preemption questions to the courts and, to a diminished extent, to the OCC. However, given the Centralization Default and the
weak ex post monitoring mechanisms at Congress’s disposal, the Act
leaves in place a likelihood of substantial policy drift. Accordingly,
the institutional choices made in the Dodd-Frank Act may not be
those best suited to achieving Congress’s preemption policy goals.
In sum, the success of Congress’s strategy will ultimately depend on
whether nudging the courts toward a purposivist interpretative
approach that permits greater ex post congressional control over
statutory meaning will also have the effect of inducing the courts to
more frequently disfavor preemption, or it will depend on whether
statutory interpretation has no meaningful impact on judicial
federalism determinations in the preemption context. If neither
supposition is correct, then Congress’s decision not to negotiate
clearer, though potentially far narrower, textualism-oriented brightline preemption rules, or not to reform the OCC’s and OTS’s
preemption policies while leaving their pre-enactment preemption
implementation role unchanged, will undermine its efforts to curb
preemption.
C ONCLUSION
Congress cannot always choose its ideal legislative option. The
legislation it enacts is necessarily bounded by the politics of the
possible. Nevertheless, in order to reach the best possible compromise, it must recognize all the critical factors that impact the
policies it seeks to elevate to the status of law. In the preemption
context, this requires Congress to have a sound understanding of
how to choose its policy implementation delegates, and how to guide
the decision making of those delegates. As this Article demonstrates, Congress’s ability to monitor judicial and agency preemption policy implementation is a critical though frequently overlooked
factor in making the delegation choice. Additionally, understanding
that the Court has adopted a pro-preemption presumption when
addressing preemption issues is fundamental to intelligently
employing the ex post monitoring mechanisms at Congress’s
disposal. As evidenced by various provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
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concerning national bank preemption, however, Congress has yet to
fully appreciate the complex interplay among legislative form,
statutory interpretation, and the Court’s Centralization Default in
preemption cases. Had it done so, it would have provided more
specific preemption instructions to the courts instead of adopting an
implied preemption standard that leaves the courts with substantial
preemption policymaking discretion.

